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Abstract 
 
     This paper estimates the benefits, primarily from human health gains, from the longest 
running U.S. CO2 control program.  Further, it examines the patterns of electric generation to 
evaluate changes at regional and state levels, to better understand the potential of CO2 leakage, 
which is CO2 being emitted from generation that has moved from a regulated to a non-regulated 
state, and thus weakening the effects of the regulation.  
     This examination is achieved using a unique dataset of observed generation levels at fossil 
fuel plants from the year 2000 to 2013, in New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.  It is 
estimated that the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) has reduced CO2 emissions in 
New York State and New Jersey by approximately 4.9 million short tons yearly on average, and 
has produced approximately $130 million worth of ancillary benefits from reduced SO2, NOX, 
PM2.5, and PM10, emissions yearly, while New Jersey participated.  Just in New York, which has 
participated every year since the program inception in 2009, RGGI has produced approximately 
3.5 million short tons and over $69 million worth of ancillary benefits yearly on average.  
Further, the study finds weak evidence that RGGI has altered generation between New York and 
Pennsylvania during the study period.  However, it finds stronger evidence that there may have 
been leakage from Maryland and Delaware to Pennsylvania.  There are indications that RGGI 
has contributed to significant changes in generation regionally in New Jersey and New York. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
     Burning fossil fuels for electricity generation creates CO2 as a by-product.  The amount of 
CO2 emitted while generating a megawatt of electricity will vary depending on the fuel type 
used: coal will emit roughly twice as much CO2 as gas will.  CO2 from electricity generation 
cannot economically be captured; when a CO2 cap is imposed on electricity generation, the only 
way to reduce CO2 emissions from fossil fuel generation, in the short run, is to change the mix of 
fuels being used to produce electricity. Changing the fuel mix will also change the levels of 
generation of conventional pollutants, such as SO2 and NOX, which can negatively impact human 
health.  Since gas is favored over coal when CO2 is capped and produces lower amounts of 
conventional pollutants, cap and trade programs for CO2 create ancillary health benefits.  There 
has been significant changes in the geographical distribution of electricity as can be seen in maps 
of actual fossil fuel generation from 2007 and 2013 (see map 1-1, and map 1-2), before and after 
RGGI was implemented. 
     RGGI is a cap and trade program, implemented in the Northeastern United States, which 
requires fossil fuel electric power generators over 25 megawatts (MW) to purchase allowances, 
at auction, for every ton of CO2 emitted from their operations.  It went into effect on January 1
st, 
2009.  Currently, there are 9 states in RGGI: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont (see map 1-3).  
Pennsylvania has acted as an “observer” to RGGI, but has not joined.  New Jersey was an 
original member of RGGI but withdrew from the program at the beginning of 2012.  The initial 
cap for RGGI was set at 188 million short tons per year, with a reduction to 165 million short 
tons (150 metric tons) per year occurring over 2012 to 2014, and then additional yearly 
reductions of 2.5% through 2020.  However, the program was updated in 2013 to lower the cap 
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even further for 2014 to 91 million short tons (83 metric tons) and further reductions of 2.5% a 
year after that.  Prices from the auctions have ranged from a low of $1.86 per allowance, 1 short 
ton of CO2 emissions, to a recent high of $5.50 per allowance in June of 2015.   
     The debate over curbing CO2 emission makes it important to understand what is gained by 
these actions, as understanding full benefits are important for informed policy decisions.  
Reducing CO2 emissions will have ancillary benefits to society by reducing costs associated with 
pollution from burning fossil fuels.  Examples of these are environmental damages such as those 
caused by acid rain, injured human health, infrastructure deterioration, and other economic 
damages.  Risk assessments relating to human health have been used to assign values to changes 
in environmental quality that result in corresponding gains in human health.  It is also important 
to understand how these benefits are distributed, and whether benefits in capped states lead to 
damages in uncapped states.  These damages would occur if leakage, emissions occurring in 
uncapped regions that replace the observed reductions in the capped region, increased generation 
of electricity in states not participating in RGGI.  Moreover, leakage is important because if there 
is a large amount of leakage from RGGI areas to non-RGGI areas, it would imply that the 
benefits from the program in terms of CO2 are overstated 
Further, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently proposed the Clean Power 
Plan, a rule for reducing CO2 emissions from existing plants in the electric sector by 
approximately 30 percent relative to 2005 levels.  It did so because electricity generation is the 
largest single source of carbon dioxide emissions and the sector accounts for about 33 percent of 
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States (EPA, 2015).  The rule calls for these goals to be 
achieved at the state level and each state is given a specific emission rate target.  States are 
allowed to submit joint plans under this rule and RGGI is singled out as an example of what such 
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a joint program may look like, provided that the program meets the full level of reductions as 
required by the rule (EPA, 2014a, 34838).   
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 introduces pertinent 
background to RGGI.  It begins with a brief history, including some of the politics surrounding 
the program.  Next, the original rules governing the program are presented, providing necessary 
background on the implementation of the program.  RGGI was updated after the completion of 
the 2012 review.  These updates give a further indication of the perception of how the program 
has functioned.  Finally, the academic literature on RGGI is discussed.  
Chapter 3 presents the relevant academic literature.  It is relatively broad, including 
studies of RGGI but also works on other systems of pollution permits, on risk assessment, and on 
computing marginal health damages from air pollution.  This literature is important for 
understanding both the theoretical basis for RGGI as well as the methods used here to determine 
its health benefits. 
Chapter 4 then develops and introduces a sequence of theoretical models of the electric 
sector that form the basis for the statistical methods discussed later in the dissertation.  The first 
set of models demonstrate how a program like RGGI can change regional patterns in generation.  
A second set of models is then used to understand how the program could cause emissions to 
leak from RGGI participants to neighboring states, and then to develop an approach for testing 
for such leakage.  
Chapter 5 presents the data sources used for the analysis and discusses the steps involved 
in constructing the dataset.  A panel data set for the years 2000 to 2013 was created using data 
from a variety of sources, including the EPA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), the  Energy Information Administration (EIA), and the Census.  The 
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primary data for this project was from the EPA’s Air Markets Data Program (AMPD), which 
provides high frequency data for electricity generation at power plants with capacities greater 
than 25 MW. 
Chapter 6 presents the methods used to estimate changes in generation induced by RGGI, 
and the health benefits that resulted.  Taking into consideration the implications from the theory 
and the characteristics of the data, it develops and presents the necessary methodology for 
evaluating RGGI’s ancillary benefits.  The analysis was conducted using a random effects Tobit 
model.  The results from that model were used to estimate the changes in air pollutants and to 
calculate changes in the health of downwind populations.   
Chapter 7 tests for emissions leakage from RGGI through testing for additional 
generation in Pennyslvania.  Leakage would cause generation that would have been generated in 
a capped region, is imported from a non-cap region instead.  In this way the cap is not being 
effective and over counts emissions abatements, as the “leaked” emissions are not actually 
abated, instead they are shifted regionally.  Specifically, it uses a Tobit model to test for leakage 
from New York to Pennsylvania.    Further, if there is leakage present, the overall societal benefit 
of the program on human health would not be clear, as it would imply that there are or may be 
areas that have large negative impacts to human health.   
Finally, Chapter 8 presents conclusions of the study regarding the overall benefits and 
likelihood of leakage.  It also provides policy implications and directions for future research.   
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Map 1-1: Generation by Fuel for New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania 2007 
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Map 1-2: Generation by Fuel for New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania 2013 
 
 
Map 1-3: RGGI Member States as of (2015) 
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Chapter 2 An Overview of RGGI 
This chapter presents historical background on RGGI, including specifics on RGGI’s 
completed auctions and a discussion of auction prices during the study period.  It also includes a 
discussion of the official review of RGGI carried out in 2012 and a review of the relevant 
academic literature. 
2.1 State Participation in the Agreement 
As shown in Figure 2-1, which presents the history of RGGI as a timeline, RGGI was 
first discussed by governors from the Northeast in 2003 after Governor Pataki of New York 
proposed the program.  The first official memorandum of understanding for RGGI was signed in 
December of 2005 by seven states: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, and Vermont.   
     From the outset, RGGI has been controversial.  It has been consistently criticized in multiple 
ways and member states have considered withdrawing from it. Some of the major themes of this 
criticism has been over electricity prices, fairness to those being regulated, and the effectiveness 
of the program.  For example, Massachusetts and Rhode Island, both originally part of the 
discussion in 2003, decided not to participate “over concerns that controls would push up energy 
prices” (DePalma, December 21, 2005, New York Times).  However, they did rejoin the 
program later, before trading began.  There were others who criticized the program for being too 
lax and argued that “the emissions cap [was] too generous” (New York Times, Sept. 26, 2008).  
Lastly, before the program went into place, there were power companies that advocated for a 
national instead of a regional program (Barringer and Galbraith, 2008, p. 3 of 4).   
     There were also concerns about RGGI in Maryland, which was demonstrated by Maryland’s 
cautious acceptance of RGGI. Maryland became the 8th member to adopt RGGI, through a state 
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law, which was signed by Governor Ehrlich (Republican).  However, the state law did not 
immediately make Maryland join RGGI and was written to allow Maryland to withdraw from 
RGGI after January 1, 2009, if concerns about electricity prices were not favorably resolved 
through a “comprehensive study of reliability and cost issues” (DePalma, April 7, 2006, New 
York Times).  Maryland did not formerly sign onto RGGI until April 20, 2007, under Governor 
O’Malley (Democrat).  Massachusetts entered RGGI in January 2007, when Governor Patrick 
(Democrat) came into office replacing Governor Romney (Republican) who had refused to sign; 
Rhode Island joined later that month when it’s newly elected Governor Carcieri (Republican) 
signed onto the program.  New Hampshire was the 11th state to join RGGI in 2008. 
    The debate over RGGI has not been limited to the beginning of RGGI.  Governor Chris 
Christy (Republican) pulled New Jersey out of RGGI at the end of 2011.  Governor Christy 
stated that RGGI was not effective as “allowances were never expensive enough to change 
behavior as they were intended to and ultimately fuel different choices.”  Further, the Governor 
stated, “RGGI does nothing more than tax electricity, tax our citizens, tax our businesses, with 
no discernible or measurable impact upon our environment” (Christy, May 26, 2011).  Since, 
then the New Jersey Legislature has twice passed bills under which New Jersey would rejoin 
RGGI.  Governor Christie vetoed both bills but legislative support for the bills has been close the 
threshold needed to override the vetoes (Martin, July 1, 2013, Bloomberg).  Proposals to 
withdraw from RGGI have arisen in New Hampshire as well.  After the New Hampshire Tea 
Party campaigned for the state to withdraw from RGGI, and a bill passed in the New Hampshire 
house (Davenport, May 29, 2011) and Senate, however the bill was vetoed by Governor Lynch 
and the override attempt failed.  
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2.2 Evolution of the Emissions Limit 
     The initial cap for RGGI was set at 188 million short tons per year, with a reduction to 165 
million short tons per year occurring in 2012 to 2014, and then additional yearly reductions of 
2.5% through 2018.   However, in 2013 the RGGI rules were updated, this update slashed the 
cap in emissions to 91 million tons of CO2, with a reduction of 2.5% in the cap each subsequent 
year until 2020 (see chart 2-2).  This study’s time period falls entirely under the original rule; 
hence the focus will be on the model rule, though the revisions will also be presented as they 
were based on a critique of the program during the study period. 
    The original model rule was developed by environmental staff members from the signature 
states and reflects significant stakeholder input, which included electric companies (RGGI, 
2007). The process resulted in a model rule for each state to use for guidance in their individual 
legislation to adopt the trading program.  There are key components of these laws that are 
important to understand for this study as they have the potential of affecting the behavior of 
power plants.  These rules define an allowance as one short ton of CO2 and allow for long 
compliance periods, safety valves, banking, and offsets.  The goal was for the rules to take be 
able to address many potential problems. 
     The RGGI “control period,” the time period that plants have to be in compliance to have 
enough allowances to cover their emissions, was set up to be over a three year period, but had 
contingencies, or “trigger events,” included that would allow for a fourth year being added to the 
control period (RGGI, 2008, p. 13).  If a plant’s emissions over the control period exceed the 
allowances it holds at the end of the control period, then it is required to buy additional 
allowances equal to three times the excess emissions (RGGI, 2008, p. 56).  Any excess 
allowances can be banked and saved to count against future emissions (RGGI, 2008, p. 58).  The 
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first control period ended on December 31, 2011, and plants had until March 1st to submit their 
allowances to RGGI (RGGI, 2008, pps. 8, 13). 
    Trigger events would have occurred if the price of RGGI allowances exceeded $7 for stage 1 
and $10 for a stage 2 type trigger event, both indexed to 2005 dollars (RGGI, 2008, p. 17-18). 
Besides the potential to increase the compliance period by a year, trigger events have 
implications for the number of allowances.  If trigger events had occurred they would have 
increased the number of offset allowances by 5 percent for a trigger one event, and 10 percent for 
a trigger two event (RGGI, 2008, p. 54). 
2.3 Allowance Auctions and Prices 
     The RGGI auction was designed to have low costs, be “[p]ercieved as fair”, be economically 
efficient, minimize collusion, minimize volatility of allowance prices, to raise revenue, and to 
work with existing market conditions (Holt et al., p. 5-6, 2007).  The design was based on a 
literature review of previous programs, and on experiments for best designs.  The program has a 
“uniform-price auction format, [where] the clearing price for the auction [is] the value of the 
highest rejected bid” (Holt et al, p. 6, 2007).  Auctions are held quarterly.  Two vintages of 
allowances, “future” and “current” were recommended to be auctioned off (Holt et al. p. 7, 
2007).  Current allowances could be used for compliance during the current three year control 
period (and were bankable for the second), and “future” permits which could be used in the 
second three year control period. 
     During the study period, emissions have been below the RGGI cap, as not all allowances have 
been sold.  The RGGI allowance sale prices have ranged from a low of $1.86 to a high of $3.51 
(nominal dollars) from 2009 to 2013.  As shown in Chart 2-3, the price started near $3 per 
allowance, and then fell to the reserve price (originally $1.86 but adjusted up based on the CPI) 
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before rebounding towards $3 per allowance in 2013Figure.  This may have been in anticipation 
of the reduced cap announced for 2014.  The number of “current” allowances sold have ranged 
from a high over 40.6 million in June 2010, to a low of 7,487,000 in the September 2011 auction 
(see Chart 2-4). 
    RGGI future allowance auctions (for the control period from 2012 to 2014) were first offered 
in the auction in March of 2009, and the last was future allowances were offered during the 
December 2011 auction.  Sales of these permits started out matching the amount of allowances 
offered, as all of the first three “Future Auctions” were sold totaling 6,520,593 allowances (see 
Figure 2-5).  However, the number of future allowances sold in the September and December 
2011 auctions fell below the number offered.  The “future allowance” prices started out at a high 
of $3.05 during the first future auction in March 2009 and then ultimately fell to the reserve price 
(see Figure 2-6). 
2.4 Formal Review in 2012 
     While the formal review does not impact the time period considered in this analysis, it does 
provide important background information on RGGI.  As called for at the time of the founding of 
RGGI, there was a comprehensive review of the program.  This review had input from 
stakeholders, and starting in 2010 there were “over 12 stakeholder meetings, webinars and 
learning sessions” relating to RGGI (RGGI, undated, p.1).  The review concluded that there was 
a surplus of available allowances, and, while never utilized, that the original “safety valve” 
mechanisms consisting of additional availability of offset allowances “would likely be 
ineffective” if they were needed (RGGI, undated, p.1). 
    To deal with the excess allowances, the report called for unsold allowances from 2012 and 
2013 to be retired (RGGI, undated, p. 3).  It also recommended significantly reducing annual 
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allowances in 2014, as mentioned above, to 91 million tons (from 165 million), with subsequent 
reductions of 2.5% each year until 2020 (see Chart 2-2 above).   The safety valve mechanism 
was enhanced by creating the cost containment reserve (CCR) “that creates a fixed additional 
supply of allowances that are only available for sale if CO2 allowance prices exceed certain price 
levels” (RGGI, Feb. 7, 2013, p. 1).  The price level was not to exceed $4 in 2014, rising by $2 
per year until 2017 when it would be $10.  After 2017 the price level would increase by 2.5% per 
year.  This was predicted to “[r]esult in a modest increase in allowance prices, with allowances 
expected to be priced at approximately $4 ($2010) per allowance in 2014 and rising to 
approximately $10 ($2010) per allowance in 2020” (RGGI, Feb. 7, 2013, p. 2).  The review did 
not expect significant changes in electricity bills to consumers—an increase of “less than 1 
percent”--but also argued that these changes would result in over $2 billion in additional auction 
revenues (RGGI, Feb. 7, 2013. p.2). 
     The report called for some additional changes and further monitoring.  First, the compliance 
period was changed to require generators to “hold allowances equal to at least 50 percent of their 
emissions in each of the first 2 years of the 3 year compliance period, in addition to 
demonstrating full compliance at the end of each 3 year compliance period” (RGGI, Feb. 7, 
2013, p. 1).  The justification for this change was “to reduce the impact of potential non-
compliance” (RGGI, 2012).  Further, the report calls for RGGI to continue to evaluate emissions, 
and “pursue additional legal research necessary, leading to a workable, practicable, and legal 
mechanism to address emissions associated with imported electricity” (RGGI, undated, p. 3). 
2.5 A Survey of the Academic Literature 
The academic literature on RGGI has focused on the design and impacts of the program.  
Work has been conducted on the auction design, the economic effects of the program, concerns 
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on CO2 leakage, and RGGI’s effect on electricity generation, both in the overall amount and 
generation mix. Finally, among analysts there is still disagreement over how effective RGGI has 
been at reducing emissions (Legrand, 2013).   
    As mentioned above, Holt et al., (2007) conducted research to inform the design of the auction 
program, and utilized both literature review and experimental work. Subsequent work on RGGI’s 
auction mechanisms includes Burtraw et al. (2009) which investigated the best way to structure 
markets to prevent collusion, and Burtraw et al. (2010) which, in part, describes early price 
discovery in RGGI and further explores auction market structuring. 
     Other work on RGGI has focused on its economic impacts.  Hibbard and Tierney (2011) 
estimated that RGGI resulted in $1.6 billion of economic value added to state economies based 
on the state expenditures from the proceeds, consumer savings, and other benefits stemming 
from spending of the auction allowances.  There are benefits from the spending of the allowance 
revenue by the states, also consumers benefits are approximately $1.1 billion due to energy 
efficiency programs, but electricity producers suffer net revenue losses of $1.6 billion (Hibbard 
and Tierney, 2011, p. 35).  Paul et al. (2010) used three different models of the electricity market 
in Maryland to determine what impacts efficiency programs funded by revenue from RGGI 
proceeds would have on levels of electricity consumption.  They found that Maryland’s economy 
would benefit from lower electricity demand and hence lowered electricity bills, due to 
improvements in efficiency.  However, the magnitude of this benefit would depend on how the 
state spent the proceeds from the auction.  They estimated that if the state spent all of the auction 
proceeds on efficiency spending it would boost the state’s economy by $150 million in 2010 
(Paul, et al., 2010, p. 6828).  Burtraw, Kahn, and Palmer (2006) analyzed the impacts of RGGI 
on the value of power plants.  They found that there would likely be plants that increased in 
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value and some that declined in value.  Further, they determined that plants that were outside of 
the RGGI region would increase in value while those that were inside of RGGI would, in 
general, decrease in value.  The impact on the value of firms depends on the secenario they used 
and the portfolio mix of emitting vs non-emitting plants (Burtraw, Kahn, and Palmer, 2006). 
    CO2 leakage from RGGI states has also been studied.  Chen (2009) found that “the amount of 
CO2 leakage is positively associated with levels of CO2 allowance prices but negatively when 
measured in percentage terms… and that NOX and SO2 emissions spillover … increases in 
commensurate with CO2 costs both in amount and percentage terms” (p. 675).  Another 
important observation found by Sauma and Chen (2010) was that, “when [a] transmission line is 
congested prior to the emissions trading in the direction of uncapped to capped region, there 
would be no pollution leakage effect since no surplus transmission capacity can support 
incremental exports” (p. 1).  Kindle, Shawhan, and Swider (2011) also tested leakage resulting 
from RGGI between Pennsylvania and New York using historical data on the scheduled flows of 
electricity between the two states.  Their study did not find evidence supporting CO2 emissions 
leakage, and they argued that the allowance “price is too low to permit the empirical detection of 
inter-regional emissions leakage” (Kindle, Shawhan, and Swider, p. 19, 2011). 
     Lee (2014) investigated the linkage between RGGI permit prices and electricity prices.   He 
found that they are not closely linked during the study period of 2009 and 2012, but still found 
that “RGGI has accelerated fuel switching” (Lee, 2014, p. 44). 
     Murray, Maniloff, and Murray (2014) utilized a yearly database from 1991 to 2011 for CO2 
emissions and electricity generation at the state level for the 48 continental states to estimate the 
effects of RGGI on electricity generation.  Their analysis uses “a three-stage econometric model 
of electricity generation,” with the first stage regression estimating state level generation 
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(Murray, Maniloff, and Murray, 2014, p. 13).  It controls for electricity price, unemployment, 
heating degree days, cooling degree days, renewable portfolio standards (RPS), RGGI, and state 
fixed effects.  The second stage regression estimates the power generated by each fuel type--coal, 
gas, and oil--and controls for fuel costs, carbon price, utilization rate, RPS, RGGI, and fixed 
effects.  Finally, their third stage estimates CO2 emissions from electricity generation, and 
controls for generation by fossil fuel, and fixed effects (Murray, Maniloff, and Murray, 2014, p. 
14). 
     First, they argue that RGGI may increase power plant capacity utilization.  However, they do 
not find significant effects of RGGI on the utilization rate of generation by fuel source, nor do 
they find the carbon price to be significant.  The authors explain this apparent contradiction as 
due to “a modest decline in the scale of generation capacity under RGGI” (Murray, Maniloff, 
and Murray, 2014, p. 16-17).   
     The study goes on to use the coefficient estimates from their first two equations to produce 
six different scenario outcomes:  
1.  Full counterfactual defined by them as “Replace natural gas prices from 2009-2011 
with those that existed in 2008, replace unemployment rates from 2007-2011 remained 
with 2007 levels, set RGGI program effect and price effect to zero, set RPS variable to 
zero.”   
2. Historical gas prices – “Replace natural gas prices from 2009-2011 with 2008 levels;” 
3. No RGGI – “Set RGGI program effect and price effect to zero;”  
4. No RPS (renewable Portfolio Standards) – “Set RPS variable to zero;  
5. No RGGI program effect;  
6. No RGGI price effect.   
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(Murray, Maniloff, and Murray, 2014, p. 19). 
These scenarios “suggest that much of the decline [in emissions] is attributable to RGGI program 
effects” and there was a much lower decline in emissions in their no RGGI scenario (Murray, 
Maniloff, and Murray, 2014, p. 20).  However, an important concern with this study is that the 
coefficients in the generation fuel source regressions were insignificant for RGGI so it is not 
clear how to interpret their results.     
     Murra, Maniloff, and Murray (2014) go on to test for leakage.  They find some evidence 
suggesting that there was some leakage of emissions to Pennsylvania, and they call for further 
research on this topic (p. 24). 
     The study concludes that emissions have been reduced for RGGI states, but these reductions 
were due to a “combination of policy, natural gas market, and macroeconomic factors that 
emerged in the late 2000s” and that at least one third of these reductions can be attributed to 
natural gas prices and availability (Murray, Maniloff, and Murray, 2014, p. 25 – 26).    Further, 
while they state that RGGI is “the dominate factor in emissions decline,” they are not able to 
determine whether RGGI’s impact is due to its carbon allowance prices or is due to other aspects 
of the policy that reduced electricity demand.  Further, they find that “some or all of the 
reduction in RGGI emissions may be countered by generation and emissions leakage in 
surrounding states” (Murray, Maniloff, and Murray, 2014, p. 26). 
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Figure 2-1: RGGI Timeline 
 
Chart 2-2: RGGI Permit Allowances Historical and Revised 
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Chart 2-3: RGGI Permit “Current” Auction Million Allowances – Available and Sold 
 
Chart 2-4: RGGI Permit “Current” Auction Prices 2008 to 2013 
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Chart 2-5: RGGI Permit “Future” Auction Allowances Offered and Sold 
 
Chart 2-6: RGGI Permit “Future” Auction Prices 
 
  
 
 
20 
 
Chapter 3 Literature Review 
3.1 Overview 
     This section reviews the literature that is not specific to the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI), but still is important for this work.  It consists of work on pollution permits, 
risk assessment, and work that has tied these two literatures together.  The pollution permit work 
is important here because it provides important theoretical understanding of RGGI as an 
institution and the effects that RGGI has on electricity generation.  Next, risk assessment is 
important to understand for the second portion of this study: the health benefits of RGGI.  Lastly, 
it presents work from Muller and Mendelsohn, which builds on the works from the pollution 
permit and risk analysis sections, and estimates marginal damages from geographically dispersed 
pollution. 
3.2 Pollution Permits 
     Many volumes could be filled with the literature on pollution permit programs.  There are 
broad themes that can characterize much of this literature.  Titenberg (2006) classifies broad 
themes in the literature as analysis of effects, spatial considerations, time considerations, 
determining how allocate allowances, market power, and monitoring and enforcement.  For this 
research the literature on spatial considerations is most pertinent, and will be emphasized in this 
review. 
      Baumol and Oates (1971) advanced the idea of “pricing and standards” which had the idea of 
starting “with a predetermined set of standards for environmental quality and impos[ing] unit 
taxes (or subsidies) sufficient to achieve” them (p. 51).  This work built upon that of Piguou who 
was the first to come up with subsidizing (taxing) external costs to make firms take them into 
account (Pigou, 1932).  The advantage of these taxes is that they would result in plants achieving 
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reductions in the least-cost manner, and by targeting a predetermined set of standards they would 
require less information on the part of the regulatory agency (1971, p. 51).  Next, David 
Montgomery had two ideas for licenses for polluting activities.  The first was a “pollution 
license” which “confers the right to emit pollutants at a rate which will cause no more than a 
specified increase in the level of pollution at a certain point”  The second was an “emission 
license” which “confers a right to emit pollutants up to a certain rate” (1972, p. 396).  One 
problem with “emission licenses” as defined by Montgomery, is that they are location-dependent 
and therefore not tradable “on a one-for-one basis” (1972, p .403).  However, he demonstrates 
that a market system can have the effect of meeting standards at multiple locations when ambient 
concentrations are taken into account (Montgomery, 1972, p. 410).  Tietenberg also developed 
an approach to deal with different levels of ambient pollution in different areas or zones.  In his 
paper, tax levels would be tailored to the necessary rates to reach goals in each zone requiring 
different standards (1973, p. 202).  His analysis is an expansion of Baumol and Oates’ work, as 
their work can be considered a simplified version of Tietenberg’s where there is only one 
pollution zone considered (1973, p. 202). 
     Atkinson and Tietenberg (1982) evaluated the costs and benefits of the two types of permit 
systems, ambient (Montgomery’s “pollution license”) and the emissions (Montgomery’s 
“emission licenses”).  They point out that ambient permit systems are complex, require lots of 
information, and could allow for total level increases (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1982, p. 102).  
Emission permit systems, on the other hand, can still allow air quality standards to be violated or 
may require greater reductions to achieve the same goals, and conditions can change over time 
resulting in one area’s actions causing another area to be out of compliance (Atkinson and 
Tietenberg, 1982, p. 103).   
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     Krupnick, Oates, and Van De Verg (1983) analyzed different forms of marketable permit 
systems that took into account spatial differences in damages.  In this paper they add to 
Montgomery’s work to allow for an optimal solution under any initial allocation of emission 
allowances.  Their analysis expanded the types of permits considered in Montgomery (1972) to 
include “pollution offsets.”  Under this approach “emission permits are subject to the restriction 
that the transfer does not result in violation of the air-quality standard at any receptor point” (p. 
238).  They also point out that for global pollutants or ones where there is “perfect mixing” the 
“market can take on a very simple structure,” and point to the market then being developed for 
CFC’s as potentially being a national market (p. 243).  The more location matters in terms of 
concentrations the more expensive a program becomes.  However, their approach nonetheless 
has the “capacity for realizing the least-cost pattern for abatement activity” (p. 247). 
3.3 Risk Assessment Literature 
    Risk assessments can be used for public policies to calculate the likely costs from a variety of 
different sources of risk.  The costs could be relating to human health, environmental damage, or 
other economic considerations that involve uncertainty.  Risk assessments relating to human 
health can be used to assign values to improvements in environmental quality that result in 
corresponding gains in human health.  At its simplest form human health risk assessment can be 
thought of as the health outcome obtained by a public policy, or: 
3.1 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑂𝑏𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 = ∆𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 × ∆𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 ×
                        𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
Equation 3.1 shows that the health outcomes from a policy are simply the change in the 
emissions rate times the change in health impact relative from the change in emissions times the 
total population affected by the policy.  Examples of the health outcomes could be reductions in 
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hospital visits, asthmas attacks, heart attacks, death rates, etc.  The health impact rates are 
determined through scientific studies on animal or human populations. 
     In general, though, risk assessments for environmental policies are more complex.  First, the 
environmental outcome has to be understood.  For example, a policy aimed at reducing pollution 
from electricity plants will not have a uniform effect on areas surrounding it as the distribution of 
the pollution will not be uniform.  One tool that is often used to model the distribution of a 
plant’s pollution over the surrounding area is the Community Multiscale Air Quality (CMAQ) 
model.  Once the impacts pollution levels in the surrounding area are estimated, changes in 
health impacts can be calculated and the method described in Equation 3.1 can be used to 
determine the overall health effect of the policy.  After the change in health outcomes is 
determined, monetary valuation can be added in through rates estimated in the economic 
literature.  For example, if the health outcome is a reduction in mortality, the value of a statistical 
life (VSL), or value of mortality risk (VMR), can be used to monetize the benefits to society. 
     One example of risk assessment software in use today is EPA’s BenMap.  BenMAP utilizes 
geographical information on pollution and population data from the Census to perform benefit 
analysis with options for both health outcomes and valuation calculations.  BenMAP has been 
used by the EPA for numerous studies on the impacts of reducing air pollution, and, notably, 
EPA recently utilized it for setting new air quality standards for particulate matter, PM2.5.  In this 
analysis the EPA recommended keeping the 24-hour standard at 35 µg/m3, and recommended 
lowering the primary annual standard to 12 µg/m3 from 15 µg/m3 (EPA 2012).  Another example 
of risk assessments is Levy, Greco, and Spengler (2002), where they analyzed predicted health 
benefits from introducing control technology to reduce particulate matter from 5 older fossil fuel 
plants within in 50 miles of Washington, D.C.  They found that populations near the plants 
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received greater benefits than the general population, with disproportionate mortality benefits for 
people with less than high school education and with reductions in childhood asthma rates for 
African Americans.  
     Uncertainty can come in every step of a risk assessment.  First, there can be a level of 
uncertainty surrounding who benefits and in what amount from the policy based on complexities 
in the transport mechanisms, especially of airborne pollutants.  Second, there is significant 
uncertainty relating to the health outcomes obtained based on the way that health impact rates are 
derived using dose-response functions.  Lastly, there is uncertainty when monetizing the benefits 
of a policy using VSL methods.  Uncertainty with the transport mechanisms will not be included 
here but uncertainty related to health outcomes and the VSL will be discussed. 
     The EPA identifies a number of factors that contribute to uncertainty in the dose response 
models.  These include model uncertainty, parameter uncertainty, and human variation.  Model 
uncertainties include: (1) the form of the model that is used to extrapolate to doses not observed, 
and (2) differences between the population sampled and the population that the inferences are 
being extended to, such as differences between children and adults (for example the information 
used below for the risk analysis was for adults ages 30 to 99), or between animal populations and 
humans.  Statistical techniques used for estimating the parameters also are associated with 
uncertainty, such as random error and measurement errors.  Lastly, human variation is simply 
that different people can have different biological responses to pollution (EPA 2005, p. 3-29 to 
3-30). 
     There are also uncertainties surrounding calculations of the VSL when relating them to 
environmental policy decisions.  First, environmental policies produce goods that are public in 
nature so it is not easy to identify the value of life from people’s personal spending.  In addition, 
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the level of altruistic motivations affects the calculations (EPA 2010, p. 7).  Altruism poses 
problems because how people feel about other’s benefits may or may not matter in the 
calculation for the VSL.  If a society has individuals making their decisions using a mix of 
altruistic and self-interested motivations, then the VSL will be higher than a society having 
individuals using only altruistic or self-interested motivations (Jones-Lee, 1992, p. 89). More 
recent work has included valuation based on more than one time period, avoidance of illness, and 
parents valuing a child’s life (Gerking et al., 2014).  Another difficulty is that studies on VSL are 
focused only on specific instances of people reducing their risks of mortality and morbidity.  
There are issues with generalizing people’s overall valuation of life from past studies, there are 
questions as to whether there should be a cancer premium as studies show that people value not 
dying from cancer more than other deaths (EPA 2010, p. 7-9). 
     Due to the high level of information needed to perform a risk analysis, there are limits to what 
can be assessed using it.  One major hurdle is that dose-response tests have to have been 
conducted to determine the toxicity of the chemical.  There are many chemicals that have the 
potential to be toxic but have not been tested (Shute 2011).  Further, there is often much 
uncertainty surrounding the dose-response at low levels of a chemical (for example, if high doses 
are used in laboratory settings and then the results are extrapolated to a low dose). There may be 
enough uncertainty in the calculation to make benefits statistically uncertain: that is, not 
necessarily different from zero. 
3.4 The Marginal Damage Approach 
 Muller and Mendelsohn, in a series of articles from 2007 to 2014 (Muller and 
Mendelsohn 2007, Muller 2011, Muller and Mendelson 2012, Muller 2014), utilize risk analysis 
and mapping methods to estimate source-specific marginal damages from point sources across 
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the United States.   Their “Air Pollution Emission Experiments and Policy” model (APEEP) 
estimates marginal damages for “nearly 10,000 sources” in the United States (Muller, 2011, p. 
2).  Their work advocates using site-specific marginal damages from multiple pollutants in 
setting policies for dealing with pollution.  Their approach is similar to the ambient permit 
approach in that it accounts for geographic variations in the damages from pollution  but instead 
of measuring concentrations, emissions rates are set based on site-specific marginal damages 
from NH3 (ammonia), PM 2.5 and PM10 (particulate matter), NOX (nitrogen oxides), SO2 (sulfur 
dioxide), and VOC (volatile organic compounds a precursor to ozone). 
     Muller and Mendelson find that urban emissions have much greater damages than rural 
emissions (2007, p. 13).  They also argues that the SO2 emissions trading program likely lowered 
social welfare, by increasing damages from emissions between $1.5 billion to $5.4 billion 
annually.  Further, they argue that there is too much emphasis on regulation by tonnage, and that 
instead regulation should be based on the damages from air pollution (Muller and Mendelson, 
2012, p. 138). 
     Muller’s work on marginal damage calculations in Muller (2014) provides a foundation for 
the calculations of total ancillary benefits from emissions reductions of SO2, NOX, PM2.5, and 
PM10, presented later in this analysis.  Note that the majority (approximately 94%) of the 
damages come from adverse effects to human health, see Table 3-1, and 3-2 (Muller and 
Mendelsohn, 2007).  However, the Muller numbers do include damages to agriculture, timber, 
visibility, materials and recreation.  Specifics on how the marginal damage values are used will 
be provided in Chapter 6. 
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Table 3-1:Gross Annual Damages $billion/year from Muller and Mendelsohn, 2007 
Pollutant Mortality Morbidity Agriculture Timber Visibility Materials Recreation Total 
PM2.5 14.4 2.6 0 0 0.4 0 0 17.4 
PM10 0 7.8 0 0 1.3 0 0 9.1 
NOX 4.4 0.8 0.7 0.05 0.2 0 0.03 6.18 
SO2 16.1 2.9 0 0 0.4 0.1 0 19.5 
Total 34.9 14.1 0.7 0.05 2.3 0.1 0.03 52.18 
Adapted from Muller & Mendelsohn, 2007, p. 8 
 
Figure 3-2:Percentage of Damages to Health and Other Causes 
Pollutant Health Other 
PM2.5 97.7% 2.3% 
PM10 85.7% 14.3% 
NOX 84.1% 15.9% 
SO2 97.4% 2.6% 
Total 93.9% 6.1% 
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Chapter 4 Models and Theory 
     This chapter presents the theoretical background for the study.  It first presents a stylized 
economic model for two electricity markets connected by a transmission line.  Next, a numerical 
example is presented of this model, to show how trade flows could occur.  After this example, 
adding multiple time periods to the model is considered.  Then the chapter presents issues 
surrounding the transport and fate of emissions, and presents a simplified example of valuing 
emissions changes.  Lastly, the chapter presents a leakage model that builds on the economic and 
emissions model presented in the first part of the chapter but adds more markets and two distinct 
geographical jurisdictions.  One of these jurisdictions is included in a cap-and-trade program and 
the other is not.  The model demonstrates the conditions necessary for leakage to occur. 
4.1 Previous Work 
     Previous work by Sauma and Chen (2010), found that transmission line congestion could 
impact trading between capped and uncapped regions, and prevent leakage of electricity 
generation from a capped region to an uncapped region.  I will expand on the observations of 
their work by including multiple heterogeneous generators which are affected differently by a 
cap in this study.  Moreover, there are two things relevant to this study that their model does not 
address.  First, transmission costs can also impact how production will be distributed between 
power plants.  Second, they do not consider that line congestion can prevent trading between 
plants that are included within a cap and trade region.  This would impact the potential gains to 
society from such a program, and would allow for potentially large differences in prices in 
trading zones adjacent to each other.  The large differences in prices have the potential to greatly 
impact the effectiveness of the program by impairing the ability of the market to shift generation 
to the lowest cost producers.  Further, their research does not address the fate of conventional 
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pollutants, and the impacts cap and trade programs aimed at global pollutants have on their 
distribution. 
 
4.2 Electricity Markets and Emissions 
      To illustrate that transmission constraints can impact where electricity is generated by 
favoring plants with higher allowance costs, under a cap and trade program, a simple model with 
two regions connected by a single transmission line is constructed (see Figure 4-1).  The model 
has two markets serving consumers in cities C1 and C2 and three power plants between the two.  
Further, the markets are connected by transmission line T1, which has a maximum capacity and 
is costly to use.  Conventional emissions from local generation affect the airsheds indicated by 
the ovals surrounding the two different markets (see Figure 4-1).   
     Although it is highly stylized1, the model provides insights on how a CO2 cap will shift 
generation, and hence emission of CO2 and conventional pollutants like SO2, and NOX, between 
the two markets depending on the characteristics of producers in each market and the condition 
of transmission line T1.  For example, in Figure 4-1, suppose plant 1 burns coal and plants 2 and 
3 burn gas, and that T1 is low-cost and unconstrained.  The introduction of a modest carbon cap 
will sharply decrease generation by plant 1and increase generation by plants 2 and 3.  Because 
conventional emissions are much higher for coal than gas, there will be large net reductions in 
conventional pollution in city 1 and small increases in conventional pollution in city 2.  
However, when trade is constrained by limits on T1, the effects could be quite different.  There 
may be less scope for reductions in plant 1’s output when additional electricity can’t be imported 
from city 2.  The result would be smaller improvements in the air quality in city 1.  Moreover, air 
                                                          
1 There are other factors that influence generation supply, demand, and distribution that are not included in this 
model, such as weather variables, economic conditions, and jurisdictional factors. 
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quality in city 2 might improve (rather than deteriorate) if gas generation is limited in city 1: 
achieving the emission cap might require reductions in emissions from plant 3.  Thus, it is clear 
that transmission costs and constraints may shift the emissions of conventional pollutants and 
have the potential to exacerbate or ameliorate geographical hotspots in these pollutants.  
Understanding RGGI’s effect on the distribution of conventional pollution will thus require 
detailed analysis of many geographically dispersed markets.  
     The model that I present in Figure 4-1 can be formalized to illustrate the different possibilities 
of cap and trade programs when transmission costs are included.  For simplicity, I use linear 
willingness to pay (WTP) curves and assume three fuels: coal, gas, and higher cost gas.  An 
example of higher cost gas is an older plant that utilizes a less efficient production method, for 
example an old steam generator versus a more modern combined cycle unit.  The model starts in 
autarchy with no links between the markets and then the analysis proceeds through a series of 
steps to link the markets under constrained and unconstrained transmission capacity.   
The demand equations for the markets are given by: 
4.1 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑧 = 𝐴𝑧 − 𝑞𝑧𝐵𝑧 
4.2 𝑞𝑧
𝐷 =
1
𝐵𝑧
 × (𝐴𝑧 − 𝑃).   
where Az and Bz are the intercept and slope, respectively, of the WTP curve in each market or 
zone, z∈ {1, 2}.  The inverse demand function is found in Equation (4.1), with 𝑞𝑧
𝐷 being the 
amount of electricity demanded in each zone z.  Further, I assume that the demand function will 
not change, and that changes in demand will only be due to consumer’s response to price 
changes2.   
                                                          
2 This is not completely accurate for RGGI, because part of the program uses proceeds from the 
allowance auctions for policies that are aimed at reducing demand. 
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     The cost that each plant incurs to produce electricity is based on its technology (see Figure 4-
2).  I assume that the producers have a highly elastic marginal cost (MC) is based on fuel costs 
(FC) and unobservable non-fuel costs (MCNF), and also that output is constrained by the 
producer’s maximum capacity so the amount of electricity produced by each fuel qfprod is lower 
than the capacity restraint for each fuel qfcap: 
4.3 MCf = FCf + MCNF 
 4.4 𝑞𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 ≤ 𝑞𝑓𝑐𝑎𝑝  
where f∈ {coal, gas, high cost gas}.   
    Combining the producers and the consumers allows us to find the market equilibrium and to 
start to understand the electricity market better (see Figure 4-3).  First, we start out with a simple 
scenario with two electricity producers--gas and coal--and one consumer.  Here equilibrium 
occurs when: 
4.5 WTP1 = P1 = MCG and MCC < MCG 
4.6 QD =  QS = qSC +qSG ≤ qCcap+qGcap (note Q
D > qCcap) 
For this scenario, equilibrium between supply and demand will occur at QD, which corresponds 
to price P1.  Price P1 is equal to the marginal cost of the highest-cost electricity producer in the 
market (in this case gas), and occurs at MCG.  When plants are subjected to a CO2 allowance, the 
marginal cost curve increases based on the fuel type of the plant and the permit allowance cost 
associated with each fuel (PACf).  With the simple market setup two scenarios are possible: the 
dispatch order can stay the same, i.e. the marginal cost of gas is greater than the marginal cost of 
coal, or it could switch.  As a result we could see RGGI causing plants to drastically change the 
amount of electricity that they produce, and perhaps even stop producing electricity entirely. 
When switching does not occur: 
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4.7 WTP1 = P1 = MCG+PACG 
4.8 QDR = QSR = qSC +qSG ≤ qCcap+qGcap 
Note that QD > qCcap and Q
DR < QD.  When switching does occur, equation (4.7) becomes: 
4.9 WTP1 = P1 = MCC+PACC 
    The simple case demonstrates that the costs of an allowance system could cause a change in 
production.  However, due to congestion and transmission costs the electric grid is much more 
complex than a simple one zone market.   
    Introducing trade into the model, we now have two markets linked by a transmission line that 
has transmission cost TC.  When trading occurs, the prices in both markets will move towards 
equalization, as electricity will be sent from the low cost market to the higher cost market (see 
Figure 4-5).  Trade between markets, with electricity production in both, can be seen in the 
following example.  Here RGGI has also been introduced, which raises each cost curve by PACf, 
which is the RGGI allowance cost associated with each fuel. 
At equilibrium we now get: 
4.10 WTP1 = P1 = MCHG+PACHG-TC 
4.11 WTP2 =  P2 = MC2 = MCHG+PACHG 
4.12 QDR = QDR1 + QDR2 = QS1+ QS2 = qSC +qSG+qSHG; qsHG < Q
S2  
4.13 WTP1 = A1 – q1B1 + A2-q2B2 
4.14 WTP2 = A2-q2B2 
 
Here market 1 and market 2 are linked.  At the clearing price between the two markets, 
electricity is imported into market 2 from market 1.  As a result the prices in both markets are 
tied together and are based on the cost of the highest marginal cost producer, with market 1 
paying the difference between the clearing price in market 2 of MCHG+PACHG less the 
transmission cost TC.  Here market 2 produces enough electricity to fill in the remaining demand 
that imports from market 1 are not able to satisfy.  
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     RGGI’s effect on the market is not immediately clear, and will depend on: the allowance cost 
per unit of CO2, the relative prices of different types of fuels, the distribution of electricity 
producers, and the transmission costs between the two markets.  As discussed above, RGGI 
could cause shifts in the dispatch order, which could contribute to changes in imports and exports 
between the markets.  RGGI could also cause a shift away from production in market 2 entirely 
if the demand for electricity can be met by imports from market 1 and the marginal cost of high-
cost gas plus the allowance cost is higher than the cost of the energy being imported from market 
1 (see Figure 4-6).   
4.15 WTP1 = P1 = MCG+PACG 
4.16 WTP2 =  P2 = MC2 = MCG+PACG+TC 
4.17 If QDR < qgcap +qccap, and TC < MCHG+FACHG 
4.18 QDR = QDR1 + QDR2 = QS 
4.19 QS = qSRC +qSRG +qSRHG ≤ qCcap+qGcap+qHGcap  
        (note QDR > qCcap+qGcap, QDR< QD, QDR1< QD1, QDR2< QD2) 
 
RGGI can have many effects on local electricity markets.  As the examples here show, these 
effects are going to depend on the differences in demand between markets, which can vary by 
time of day, the amount of production in each market, and the relative costs of electricity 
production the different markets.  Note that if equation 4.17 holds, then we will see that the 
quantity of electricity supplied by the high cost gas plant will be 0. 
     Air sheds for conventional pollutants, such as SO2, NOX, and PM
3, are included in the model 
as ovals surrounding the two different markets.  Currently, uniform mixing and identical 
transport functions for each pollutant are assumed.  I consider three scenarios with this model, 
with varying constraints on trade and costs of transmission on TC1.   The economic model, 
(Figure 4-1), determines how electricity generation shifts between two markets via T1, and the 
                                                          
3 Particulate matter is currently not included in the analysis, and will be obtained from the National Emissions 
Inventory NEI database for the analysis. 
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air sheds demonstrate where resulting emissions of conventional pollutants in the two markets 
will be experienced.  This allows for insights to be made on how a CO2 cap will shift generation, 
and hence emission levels of the conventional pollutants, between the two markets depending on 
the characteristics of producers in each market. 
4.2.1 A Note about Time Periods 
     The production model above applies at every period of time. These time periods could be as a 
short as an hour.  Note at the hourly level there are likely some interesting properties due to 
potential changes in behavior associated with different start-up costs for different types of 
generators, and different transmission costs occurring at different times during the day.  
However, this study will focus on monthly totals.  It is important to note that due to changes in 
relative costs to generate electricity from different fuels, from month to month, or season to 
season, the relationships between plants, in terms of the possible outcomes in the model 
scenarios can change.  Whereas in one month there may be no trading due to TC being too high, 
in another month the relative prices of coal versus gas could change, and perhaps make trading 
occur. 
4.3 A Model of Emissions Leakage Between Jurisdictions  
     Another simple model was developed to better understand whether electricity markets cause 
leakage of CO2 from RGGI to non-RGGI states through changes in electricity generation.  This 
model is developed with 4 connected markets, served by 4 different power plants as shown in 
Figure 4-11.  These plants can be thought of as running on the same fuels, and using the same 
technologies, as the plants considered in section 4.1.  Further, assuming that each of the 4 plants 
has the same marginal cost (MC) curve, and each market has the same demand function for 
electricity, in autarky each market will have the structure shown in Figure 4-12.  However, each 
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market is actually connected to the others and has transmission cost T to send electricity to an 
adjacent market.  Four cases are developed that demonstrate the relationship between permit 
allowance costs and transmissions costs, and provide insight as to how this relationship will 
affect trading between two areas when one area has cap-and-trade permits and the other does not. 
     Each market has identical costs and enough capacity to meet its own local demand.  So in 
autarky each plant generates enough energy for its own market. No trading will occur due to the 
positive transmission costs between each market and the identical marginal costs for each plant.  
From here, a permit system is introduced to the model in markets 1 and 2, so now the plants in 
those markets produce at their marginal cost plus the permit allowance cost (MC + PAC), while 
the plants in markets 3 and 4 will continue to produce at marginal cost MC. 
    In the first case, suppose the transmission cost T is greater than the permit allowance cost 
PAC.  If so, there will not be any trading between the markets.  We will also see a divergence in 
price between the markets under the cap (1 and 2), and those that are not under the cap (3 and 4).  
In markets 1 and 2 prices will rise to the marginal cost plus the permit allowance cost 
(MC+PAC), and in markets 3 and 4 the price of electricity will remain equal to MC (see Figure 
4-13).  The amount of electricity generated in markets 1 and 2 will fall from QD to QDcap.  No 
trading will occur because markets 3 and 4 would need to sell the electricity at below marginal 
cost for it to match the price in the capped markets.  The price sellers in 3 and 4 would have to 
receive would be MC+PAC, but it would cost them MC+T to supply markets 1 and 2.  Since 
PAC >, T they would be selling electricity at a loss under this scenario.  As such, the amount of 
generation in markets 3 and 4 will remain QD. 
     In the second case, suppose the permit allowance cost is greater than the transmission cost but 
not greater than twice the transmission cost (T < PAC < 2T).  In this case we will see trade 
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between markets 2 and 3 but markets 1 and 4 will stay isolated from the others (see Figure 4-14).  
Market 2 will now import Qtraded from market 3, and the power plant in market 2 will now 
produce QDcap - Qtraded.  Market 3 will have its demand function expanded from D to D’ with the 
extra demand added in from market 2.  Market 3’s price will move up from its marginal cost by 
the difference between the permit allowance cost and the transmission cost to MC+PAC-T.  
Market 2’s price will stay at the marginal cost plus the permit allowance cost. 
     In the third case, suppose the permit allowance cost is greater than 2T but less than 3T.  This 
will create trade between markets 2, 3, and 4 (see Figure 4-15).  Even after including the 
transmission cost, markets 3 and 4 will be able to generate and transport electricity to market 2 at 
a lower cost than market 2 power plants will be able to produce it.  Market 1 will remain isolated 
as in case 2: although sellers in market 2 could send electricity to market 1 and still make a profit 
on the sale, there would be a larger profit from selling in their own market.  Market 3 will also 
send electricity to market 2, as even after the transmission cost of 2T the delivered cost will be 
lower than the cost of electricity produced in market 2 (MC + PAC).   
     In the fourth case, suppose the permit cost is now greater than 3T (see Figure 4-16).  Also, 
assume that there is enough extra capacity in markets 3 and 4 to entirely meet the demand for 
electricity in market 2.  In this case, local production market 2 will cease and the market will be 
entirely served by importing electricity from markets 3 and 4.  Market 1 will also receive some 
imported electricity from markets 3 and 4.  Market 1 will have a price of MC+PAC, and will still 
import lower cost electricity from market 3 or 4.  Market 2 will have a price of MC+PAC-T.  
Market 3 will have a price of MC+PAC-2T, and market 4 will be at MC+PAC-3T.  
     As mentioned above, these scenarios are not exhaustive. There are many variations which 
could be considered, and there are ways that market 3 could actually receive imports from 
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market 2, even under an allowance permit.  For example, if there are no constraints, a low 
transmission cost, and a very high price in market 3, due to an old inefficient plant, relative to the 
rest of the markets, then you could in theory see power sent from market 2 to market 3.     
     This model is very simple but it does imply that if leakage is going to happen it is most likely 
to affect generation at the border between RGGI and non-RGGI states first.  As one moves 
farther away from the border, the cost of transmission relative to the cost of permit allowances is 
going increase and, other things equal, trading will be less likely.  The counties closest to the 
border between New York and Pennsylvania are hence the most likely to have leakage impact 
them. 
4.4 Modeling Transport and Fate of Pollutants 
In addition to modeling electricity markets, to evaluate the health impacts of RGGI it was 
also necessary to model the fate and transport of pollutants.  To understand the health benefits of 
policies that reduce pollution two steps are required.  First, it is necessary to understand what 
areas are receiving the benefits of reduced pollution.  Second, it is necessary to understand how 
people in those areas are affected by reductions in pollution.  Both of these steps are rather 
complex but fortunately there are software tools supported by the EPA to address both steps.  
Further, recent work by Muller (2014) also helps with this step.  However, it is still necessary to 
understand the basic logic that goes into this calculation. 
     The location of pollution concentration reductions is dependent on atmospheric transport, 
which involves complex chemical pathways that dictate how far contaminants travel and what 
species of chemical will arrive at different locations.  Wind speed, time of day, temperature, and 
other weather considerations will determine the speed of transport and chemical reactions that 
will occur.  These chemical reactions will determine the level of different types of pollutants.  
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For example, SO2 and NOX can be transformed into secondary particulate matter.  Air transport 
models, such as CMAQ (EPA 2014) and CALPUFF (Exponent 2014), have been developed to 
deal with these complexities when it comes to the policy making process.  These models take 
into account atmospheric conditions, weather, and chemical and physical properties of pollutants 
to determine where pollutants are transported. 
4.5 An Example Risk Assessment 
Turning next to methods for evaluating the impact of pollution abatement on health, 
consider an illustrative risk analysis for the Buffalo, New York, metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA), for a 25% reduction in particulate matter (PM2.5).  Particulate matter is used as it has a 
relatively short transport distance and hence its fate is easier to estimate.  The Buffalo MSA is in 
Western New York, and consists of Erie and Niagara Counties, which have populations of 
919,040, and 216,469 according to the 2010 U.S. Census (Census 2013).  To perform this 
analysis, information for the two counties was also collected on the concentration of PM2.5 (from 
the EPA) and on mortality rates (from the CDC).  The concentrations of PM2.5 were obtained for 
four locations in the MSA daily for 2012 from the EPA.  As a first order approximation for use 
in the risk analysis, the average daily concentration was calculated as 9.49 µg/m3.  All-cause 
mortality rates were obtained from the CDC’s Wonder database for 2010.  There were 21,914, 
and 5,716 all-cause deaths, for Erie and Niagara Counties respectively, corresponding to 0.024 
and 0.026 mortality incidence rates (CDC Wonder). 
    There are multiple studies that give dose-response relationships for PM2.5. For this analysis, 
Pope et al. (2002) was used because: (1)  EPA has calculated coefficients from it to use in its 
formula for calculating changes in incidence rates, and (2) “Pope et al., 2002, may be the most 
generalizable [of PM studies] because it had the largest sample size (approximately 500,000)” 
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(Casper, 2008, p. 2).  Pope et al. (2002) uses a log-linear model so the incidence rate given by the 
EPA (2012b, p. 44) is: 
4.20 ∆𝑦 = 𝑦0 × (1 −
1
exp (𝛽×∆𝑃𝑀)
) 
Where Δy is the change in incidence rate for all-cause mortality (this is the health impact rate in 
equation 4-20, y0 is the base rate of all-cause mortality, and ΔPM is the change in the 
concentration of PM2.5 in µg/m
3. Lastly, β is the coefficient from the Pope et al. study, and is 
given by the EPA as .005827 (EPA 2012, p. 75). 
     Equation (4-20) can be used to calculate the change in mortality, Δy, for each county.  The 
result is then multiplied by the population of the county to produce the predicted change in 
overall mortality.  This gives estimates of approximately 302 and 77 deaths avoided for Erie and 
Niagara Counties, respectively, for a 25 percent reduction in PM2.5. 
    Further research could improve the estimate in several respects.  First, the concentrations of 
PM2.5 could be better split up between the two counties in the research area and, ideally, the city 
of Buffalo would be split out of the overall MSA to better understand the differences in local 
jurisdictions.  Next, mortality rates could be broken down so that the types of deaths could be 
better estimated, as Pope et al. gives mortality risks for cardiopulmonary causes and lung cancer 
as well as all-cause mortality.  Further, it could be expanded to include additional health 
outcomes such as asthma attacks and hospital admittance.  Moreover, with a more sophisticated 
air model with greater geographic resolution, the benefits distribution could be estimated by 
demographic and regional groups.  Lastly, maximum concentrations in a 24 hour time period as 
well as average concentrations could be analyzed to further understand benefits of improvements 
in air quality. 
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Figure 4-1: Electricity Markets and Emission areas 
 
Figure 4-2: Electricity Producers Cost Curves 
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Figure 4-3: One Market with Gas and Coal 
 
Figure 4-4: Two Scenarios for Market under RGGI 
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Figure 4-5: Trade with RGGI 
 
Figure 4-6: Trade with RGGI, market 2 shuts down 
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Figure 4-7: Leakage Model 
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Figure 4-8: Each Market in Autarky 
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Figure 4-9:Case 1 Transmission Costs greater than Permit Allowance Costs 
 
Figure 4-10: Case 2 Trading Between Markets 2 and 3 
 
 
 
46 
 
Figure 4-11: Case 3 Trading Between Markets 2, 3, and 4 
 
 
Figure 4-12: Case 4 Trading Between All Markets 
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Chapter 5 Constructing the Dataset 
     To determine the effect of RGGI on the generation at the plant level this analysis utilizes a 
panel data set.  The panel nature of the data set, with multiple states, counties, and plants help to 
control for fixed effects, and will allow for estimation of RGGI’s effect on generation by fuel 
type.  The states selected are interesting due to the fact that New Jersey’s participation in the 
program changes during the time period of the study, as New Jersey withdrew from the program 
at the end of 2011 after being an original participant in the program in 2009.  New York has 
always been a member of the program, and Pennsylvania never joined.  Both states are also 
relatively large generators regionally.  The dataset for the analysis starts at the beginning of the 
year 2000 and runs to the end of 2013.  I use a variety of sources for the information in the 
database, including the EPA, NOAA, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), and the 
U.S. Census. 
5.1 EPA’s AMPD Dataset 
    The most important data for this project comes from the EPA’s Air Markets Program Data 
(AMPD), which has hourly reports from power plants across the country.  In general, power 
plants burning fossil fuels are required to report to the EPA if they have generating capacity 
greater than 25 megawatts under the Acid Rain Program (ARP) (EPA, 2009, p. 2).  Plants in the 
ARP program are required to report year round.  Other plants can be required to either report 
year round or only during specific seasons depending on if the plant is subject to the annual 
CAIR SO2 and NOX or the seasonal CAIR NOx program (EPA, 2009, p. 68).  Data from the ARP 
exists dating back to 1995, when it was first collected.  However, at that time not all plants were 
required to report: only 110 facilities, nationwide, were originally affected.  Starting in 2000, the 
current ARP rules for reporting were put into place.  In general, these plants report hourly their 
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electricity generation, heat input, SO2, NOX, and CO2 emissions.  The data set also has plant 
demographic information at the yearly level.  Map 5-1 shows the distribution of these plants in 
2007.  As noted in Chapter 1, the location of plants reporting does vary year to year. 
     An example of this data can be seen for plant for plant 6082.  This plant is a coal plant in 
Niagara County, New York.  Figure 5-2 shows hourly observations of heat input in mmBtu 
plotted against the generation in MWh for 2009 for this plant.  It is interesting to note that at the 
hourly level this plant shows a start-up cost in terms of needing to apply about 1000 mmBtu’s of 
heat before electricity generation begins. 
5.1.1 AMPD Data Processing 
     AMPD data comes in zipped csv monthly files at hourly resolution for each state.  To be able 
to work with this data it is necessary to process it.  A series of Stata “do” files were created to 
process the data to make it ready to be merged with other data sets, and ultimately for analysis.  
The files contain hourly data for units. 
      The first do file, reads in the .csv files from AMPD, and processes the observations to make 
them in uniform formats for merging.  For example, in some plants the unit identifier for plants 
are numeric, and in others they are alpha numeric, resulting in two different variable types and 
preventing a successful merge later on.  The output of this “program” is two files; the first is a 
plant key file, and the other contains the observations.   Both files contain a key "code" to be able 
to combine again later.  The second do file goes through each year and merges individual state 
by month files into monthly files of all plants in the identified states, still at the hourly resolution 
here. 
     The third do file goes through each year and merges the individual state and local monthly 
files into one large Stata database.   It also creates a unique code for each plant, “orispl_unit_12”, 
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by ORISPL code (Office of Regulatory Information Systems Plant Location code, which is each 
facility’s unique identifier) and generation unit id.  It accomplishes this by adding leading zeros 
to plants with ORISPL codes and unit identification codes containing less than six characters.  
This is necessary to create unique identifiers, as it would be possible to have two plants having 
the same code if the ORISPL code and unit id were combined without this additional step.  The 
program also makes sure that all variable names are identified consistently by year, as in some 
cases the variable names changed between different source data files.  For example, generation 
load, given in MWh, was identified in different files as “gload” and “gloadmw.”  The more 
descriptive variable name was retained, so in this case gloadmw was retained since it indicates 
that the generation load of each plant is in megawatts. 
     After the observations are merged it is necessary to merge the key files, which has the 
demographic data (plant and state name), so that it will be in a compatible format with the 
observations.  The information in this file was moved into its own system to save on processing 
time due to the size of the data set.  The next processing step for the raw AMPD data is to merge 
the above files back together.  First, the yearly demographic data for each plant is merged with 
the two files above to create the full AMPD data set.  Only plants reporting a generation level are 
retained.  Next, the data set is aggregated to monthly values.  This is done by summing values for 
generation, SO2, NOX and CO2, and by averaging. 
     AMPD gives very detailed fuel definitions, sometimes including multiple fuel types that a 
plant may burn.  These fuel types are mapped to three main categories, coal, oil, and gas4.  For 
example, some plants have a primary fuel source described as “Diesel Oil, Pipeline Natural Gas” 
these are mapped to being oil for this analysis.  For a full listing of fuel types in the data set and 
                                                          
4 Note that there are some plants that burn wood and biomass, however these are not considered for this analysis. 
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the mapping please see Table 5-3. Secondary fuel sources are given by AMPD.  However, there 
is no way to determine whether any observation is being run with the primary or secondary fuel, 
therefore it is assumed that the primary fuel source is the fuel source for all observations for each 
year that it is reported. 
     A “plant runs” dummy variable is created and set to 1 if the plant was observed to run to at 
least 300 MWh during a month.  Since the data is censored and, in general, only contains 
observations where the plant was observed to run, the data was “filled-in” with observations that 
included no generation.  When plants had not been built yet, these zero generation observations 
were removed from the dataset.  When a plant was not observed to run, or had too low of 
generation to be counted as run (as defined above) the log of the generation was set to 0.  
Otherwise, the log of the generation was created for each observation.  An example of plants not 
always running can be seen with plant 2549 unit 66.  This unit is a coal generator located in Erie 
County, New York.  The plant reports running for 9 out of 12 months (see Figure 5-4).  Plants 
are required to continuously report, and the EPA does have procedures to replace missing 
observations with “conservatively high” values (EPA 2009, p. 87) so missing data is assumed 
due to plants not actively generating electricity. 
     Additional information is needed to create the final dataset, to control for electricity supply 
and demand.  Data form NOAA was obtained with temperatures (daily max and min) which was 
averaged for each month and county in New York and Pennsylvania (see below for how this file 
was created).  Monthly data from the EIA for fuel costs for generating electricity from coal, gas, 
and oil was also added to the data, based on the fuel used at each unit (see below for description).   
Census data is also added to the data set.  Each county’s population (yearly) is merged onto the 
data. 
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5.1.2 AMPD Plant Demographics 
     The “Facility Attributes” for all plants from 2000 to 2013 were downloaded from the EPA’s 
Air Markets Data website, using the EPA’s query tool.  AMPD collects data on more than just 
electricity producers, as such it is necessary to trim down the facilities reported in the dataset, for 
example cement manufacturers are included in the downloaded data set.  This trimming is 
accomplished by keeping only those plants that are identified by the EPA as having a “source 
category” of cogeneration, electric utility, and small power producer.  The EPA defines “source 
category” as: “Description of a facility that classifies it in terms of the primary business the 
facility conducts” (EPA, 2014). 
  For the three states in the data set, only Pennsylvania had plants listed as being in the category 
of “small power producer.”  Four different plants were labeled this way.  These producers had 
reported capacities in mmBtu/hr of between 450 and 1300.  At 450 mmBtu/hr using estimates of 
power from EIA this would correspond to a roughly 42 MWh plant.  Since RGGI applies to 
plants over 25 MWh, these plants are retained in the data set.  
     There are 72 missing primary fuel type indicators over 7 plants.  The ORISPL codes for these 
plants are 3096, 3099, 3130, 7314, 50358, 55298, and 55690.  Forty-two of these missing fuel 
types are at plant 3099 in Pennsylvania, but the file indicates that this plant has been retired, so 
this plant is dropped from the data set. 
     Plant 3096 had 12 missing observations.  Six of these came from the three units identified as 
1A, 1B, and 1C.  All three of these missing observations for 2000 and 2001, but have 
observations for 2002 that are labeled “Diesel oil.”  As such the missing observations are filled 
in as Diesel oil.  The plant is also missing 2000 and 2001 from units labeled 2A, 2B, and 3.  For 
each of these units the fuel type is listed as “Pipeline Natural Gas” for 2002 to 2013, so the 
missing observations are filled in as “Pipeline Natural Gas.” 
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    Plant 3130 was also missing 12 observations for fuel type for its units.  This plant was missing 
observations on fuel type for three out of five units from 2004 to 2006, and for 2009.  All the 
observed fuel types at the plant are either for “Coal Refuse,” or “Coal” as such the missing 
observations were mapped to being “Coal” as coal refuse is mapped to coal in this study in the 
next step. 
    Plant 7314 was missing one observation for primary fuel type, in 2000.  Since the primary fuel 
for all of the other observations were “Pipeline Natural Gas,” the missing observation was coded 
the same.   
     Plant 50358 was missing three primary fuel observations.  This is a cogeneration plant in 
Pennsylvania that has incomplete data for 2000 to 2002.  It does not have any reported primary 
fuel.  Therefore it was dropped from the dataset.  It is also missing heat input capacity data for all 
three years. 
     Plant 55298 was also missing 1 observation.  It is missing the primary fuel type for one unit in 
2002, and there observations for the plant from 2000 to 2013, and all of them are “Pipeline 
Natural Gas.”  Therefore, the missing observation was coded as “Pipeline Natural Gas.”  
     Plant 55690 is missing 1 observation for one unit of fuel type.  Just like above all other units 
are coded as “Pipeline Natural Gas,” so this is filled in as the missing unit’s designation. 
    The plant demographic data was also missing 1286 input capacity observations at the unit 
level, out of a total possible 7076 observations.  The vast majority of these missing observations 
are in 2000 (609 missing) and 2001 (633 missing).  To address these missing data points, a 
unique identifier was created using the orispl code and the unit id. Then I used Stata’s time series 
functions to fill in missing variables from those in the time periods immediately following.  I did 
this twice, so that many of the 2001 missing points could be moved to 2000 also.  No additional 
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observations were recovered with a third iteration of this procedure.  That left a total of 55 unit 
capacity in mmBtu/hr yearly observations still missing.  These missing observations were at four 
plants.   
    Many of these missing observations occurred at plant number 2529.  This plant burned coal 
and is indicated to have retired on 5/1/2007.  The plant has 4 units, which have heat capacity 
numbers for the year 2000, but not for subsequent years.  As such the values 445 for units 1 and 
2 and 475 for units 3 and 4 are used to fill in for the subsequent years by unit. 
          Plant 2404 had 16 missing observations.  Three units at this plant had 5 missing 
observations each, 5001, 7001, and 11001.  The unit 9001 had one missing observation.  None 
these units had any observations that were filled in, and all of them had a commercial operation 
date of 5/4/1973.  Since no other units at the plant were listed with this operation date, these 
observations were not recoded effectively keeping them out of the analysis. 
     Six of the observations occur at plant 2526, which is a coal plant in Broome County, NY.  
The missing observations occur when the plant is indicated as having the status of “Long-term 
Cold Storage” and “Retired.”  As such these observations are not filled in. 
   The last missing observation comes from plant 55298.  It has one missing capacity for year 
2002, but the operating status of the unit in that year is labeled as “Future” and the plant does not 
have any observations until 2004, so it appears it should be missing, and is, also, left alone. 
5.1.3 AMPD Data Description 
    The generation mix has changed over time in all three states.  Each has had a general 
downward trend in the number of coal units generating electricity each month (Figure 5-5).  
Pennsylvania has the most coal producing units during the observation period.  New York has 
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the second most, however this number drops and is very similar to the number of units reporting 
in New Jersey by the end. 
     The number of gas units generating electricity each month has had a clear upward trend in all 
three states (Figure 5-6).  At the beginning of the sample New York and New Jersey had similar 
numbers of gas generators running monthly.  However, by the end of the New York has clearly 
more gas units running in any given month.  Pennsylvania’s gas generation starts close to zero at 
the beginning of the data set.  It steadily rises throughout the data and reaches just below the 
generation in New Jersey from gas units by the end of the observation period. 
   Oil generation has declined over time (from a high in early 2000s, but appears to have mostly 
stabilized after that with a slight downward trend (Figure 5-7).  New York has the most oil units 
running of all three states.  New Jersey and Pennsylvania have similar numbers of units running, 
to the point where there is significant overlap on the graph. 
     All three types of fuels show seasonality.  Further, each state shows overall trends and 
changes in their fuel mixes (more on that below).  This generation in the three states is not 
uniformly distributed as was seen in Map 5-1 above.  For example in general gas units are more 
dispersed than the coal generation units.  This means that shifts in the generation mix will lead to 
changes in the location of generation. 
     The total number of observations for generation, SO2, NOX, and CO2 varies.  There are a 
significant number of observations that have generation but do not have pollutant observations.  
The data set has 65,352 observed data points for generation, 64,954 NOX observations, 45,080 
SO2 observations, and 45,088 observations reported for CO2.  The limitations of the observations 
for pollutants will be taken into account in the latter stages of this research.  There are more 
observations missing for pollutants in the early years for the dataset.  For example, in the year 
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2000, there are 4,104 monthly generation observations.  However, the pollutant observations are 
significantly lower for this year; there are 4,027 NOX, 1,753 CO2, and 1,760 SO2 observations. 
     Average rates of pollution per MWh of electricity generated vary greatly in the data.  Average 
rates of pollution vary by state, fuel, year, and generation level.  For example, the rate of lbs of 
SO2 per MWh of electricity for coal varies from a low in New York of 10.149 lbs/MWh to a 
high of 12.9 lbs/MWh in Pennsylvania.  Pennsylvania also has the highest rate of SO2 emissions 
for Oil, but the lowest for gas generation.  For NOX, New York has the lowest rate of emissions, 
and New Jersey is the highest (by over 1 lbs/MWh).  Lastly, CO2 rates do vary but not as 
significantly as the other pollutant rates do, the highest CO2 emission for coal occur in New 
Jersey (see Table 5-8). 
     Total fossil fuel generation by fuel for each state over the entire data set can be seen in Figure 
5-9.  Trends in total fossil fuel generation are difficult to generalize for all of the states in the 
sample, and overall have been reasonably flat but with some volatility from year to year.  All of 
the states have had different years for their maximum level of total fossil generation.  The 
highest total fossil generation for New Jersey occurred in 2010 with over 22.6 TWh of 
generation (during New Jersey’s participation in RGGI), in New York it occurred in 2005 with 
over 78.1 TWh of generation, and in Pennsylvania it occurred in 2001 at over 137.1 TWh of 
electricity. 
     Breaking the generation out by fuel type in the bar graphs below for 2008, 2011, and 2013 
(Figure 5-10) we can see that since 2008 there has been a general downward trend in coal 
generation, and an upward trend in gas generation in all three states. 
     As mentioned above this data is combined with extra sources of data to create the final 
database.  However, EIA plant data was planned to be used, but it turned out to be incompatible 
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with the EPA AMPD information described here.  While, in theory EIA and AMPD should line 
up, some plants in the two data sets have widely varying reported generation capacity between 
what would seemingly be the same units.  Further, since different boilers can service different 
generators, mapping between the two definitions is not trivial and many units inside of plants do 
not have a clear link between EPA’s AMPD and EIA data.  As a result AMPD demographic data 
for capacity (given in mmBtu/hr) is used instead of EIA capacity data per plant5. 
     Average fuel price was obtained from EIA’s Monthly Energy Review, Table 9.9 “Cost of 
fossil-fuel receipts at electric generating plants.”  This provides prices in dollars per million 
BTU, including taxes for coal, oil, gas, and other fossil fuels.  For oil, the variable “Total 
Petroleum Receipts” was used to approximate the cost to plants.  Fuel prices have behaved 
differently for each fuel per million BTU in the data set from 2000 to 2013.  As can be seen in 
Figure 5-11, below, coal prices have remained relatively stable over time, with a slight increase.  
The cost of gas and oil roughly followed each other until approximately 2009, when the cost of 
gas fell and the cost of oil increased.  Even with the falling price of gas, it is still relatively more 
expensive per mmBtu than coal. 
5.1.4 Linear Relationship Between Generation and Fuel Use 
     In general, at the monthly level the generation from the plants plotted against the heat input 
shows linear patterns.  Different units have different efficiency rates; these rates will vary by fuel 
and other variables.  For this reason, the pattern of generation to heat input will be described for 
each fuel type.  There are some times when this relationship does not hold, especially around 0 
MWh of output, this is likely due to extra fuel needed at start-up and for times when the plant is 
                                                          
5 Note that these generation numbers are different then EIA numbers.  EPA presumably calculates these numbers 
by observing the generation from individual plants. 
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on standby and generation is not active, though the plants are still burning fuel.  Since the pattern 
seems most difficult to see in gas, and easiest to see in oil, gas will be presented first, and oil last. 
     Looking at all of the gas generation on aggregate does not show a clear pattern (see Figure 5-
12).  It does appear that there may be multiple linear patterns present.  To see these patterns it is 
helpful to look at the data at the plant and unit level.  A couple of plants have been selected to 
demonstrate the general linear patterns in the data. 
     The first plant selected was plant 50006.  This plant demonstrates a few of the potential issues 
with the data.  Looking at the overall production of the plant (upper left hand corner of Figure 5-
13) we can see three potential linear patterns.  There are a total of 6 generation units reported in 
AMPD for this plant, which are shown separated out (two at a time) in the other plots of Figure 
5-13.  We can see responses for each unit that appear to have multiple linear patterns that can be 
traced from the origin. We can explain this phenomenon by looking at the EIA data on the boiler 
and generator associations.  The EIA maintains a list of boilers (where combustion takes place) 
and the generator, which is where electricity generation takes place.  Boilers can be arranged in 
either a one-to-one or boilers can be tied to multiple generators.  In Table 5-14, we can see that 
there are multiple connections between boilers and generators for plant 50006.  As such it would 
be logical to potentially see the bands of patterns as generation changes based not only on the 
amount of fuel being used, but on the relative efficiencies of different boilers and combinations 
of boilers.6  Taking this into consideration and looking at the break down generation by unit id, 
we can justify a linear relationship for this plant between heat input and electricity generation. 
                                                          
6 Note as mentioned in the Data chapter Boiler and Generator id’s do not match between EIA and EPA’s AMPD 
dataset. This plant illustrates the difference between the two files.  AMPD shows 6 different units, however, in this 
case EIA shows 3 generators and 5 boilers. 
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      Coal follows a similar overall pattern to gas in that it appears to have more than one potential 
linear projection.  When we look at all coal generation we get a graph that appears like it may 
have roughly two different linear clusters on it (see Figure 5-15).  Again to understand the 
pattern we split out plants to see different behavior at the unit level.  Three plants were selected 
3179, 54634, and 6082. 
     Plant 3179’s observations occur on the lower left hand corner of the overall coal observations 
in Figure 5-16.  Looking at Figure 5 we can see that in general there appears to be a linear 
relationship for all three units.  There are a few observations roughly 3 for unit 3, and 3 for unit 1 
that fall outside of the band of most observations for the plant.  However, the vast majority of the 
observations follow a general linear pattern, and outliers are not entirely unexpected due to 
variances in fuel and differences in efficiency at start up and when plants are running but not 
actively generating due to demand fluctuations. 
   Plant 54634 has only one unit.  Its observations show up at the higher linear projection (less 
efficient) from the majority of the coal observations.  This plant does still show an overall linear 
relationship seen in Figure 5-17. 
    Plant 6032, also, has only one unit.  Its observations are clustered with the majority of the coal 
observations, and also contains some of the outliers at the less efficient side of the overall 
grouping.  Still besides the few outliers, the pattern of generation to heat input clearly shows a 
linear pattern as can be seen in Figure 5-18. 
     For plants that generate using oil as a primary fuel source, there does not appear to be as 
much variation in the relationship of heat to generation as the other two fuel types.  As can be 
seen in Figure 5-19 below, the relationship between heat input and generation is roughly linear 
for all oil plants in the data set, with less variance from the pattern than either coal or gas. 
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     Plant 2516 was pulled out as Unit 3 in this plant contains two of the outliers on the overall oil 
plot (see Figure 5-20).  These outliers occur at 4 million mmBtu and roughly 200 GWh, and at .5 
million mmBtu and just over 150 GWh.  Breaking the plants generation out, and down by unit 
still display an overall approximately linear project. 
     Looking at the overall heat input to generation relationships for each fuel, and individual 
plants for each fuel it can be demonstrated that a linear approximation is appropriate for this 
relationship.  Approximately linear relationships held for each fuel type, at multiple different 
plants that represented different ratios for these fuel types. 
5.2 National Emission Inventory PM Data 
     Particulate Matter data is not included in the AMPD data set, and as such to be able to get an 
estimate EPA’s National Emission Inventory data is used (EPA 2008, EPA 2011).  Data for  
PM10 (filt + Cond) and PM2.5 (Filt+Cond) for New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania for Fuel 
Combustion, Coal, Oil, and Natural Gas was downloaded for both 2008 and 2011.  Next, the PM 
data was processed and combined with the generation data for both 2008 and 2011.  There were 
13 counties each year that did not have either emissions data from NEI or generation data from 
the AMPD data set.  The list of counties was not identical each year.  Most of the counties with 
missing PM data are from gas generation and can be seen in Table 5-21 below, note the yearly 
generation number indicates the generation in the year that observations are missing in NEI from 
that year.  There were also 80 counties that had PM reported as being from the electric industry 
that were in NEI but not in the AMPD dataset for 2008, and 82 for 2011.  For 2011 the average 
pm 2.5 for these counties is significantly lower than the average for the counties that matched 
between the two data sets.  For the NEI only counties the average PM2.5 level was 2.86 short tons 
per year, while for the matching counties that average was 118.45 short tons per year. 
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     Using the combined data, described above, for 2008 and 2011 PM2.5 and PM10 (with PM2.5 
subtracted) rates were determined for each state in the analysis As can be seen in table Y, there is 
large variation between rates in different states for each fuel source.  New York has the lowest 
average PM2.5 rate for coal but the highest PM10 rate for coal.  New Jersey’s PM10 rate is much 
lower than the other state rates. For gas all of the states look reasonably similar for PM2.5.  Here 
again, New Jersey’s PM10 rate is an order of magnitude less than the other state rates.  Lastly, 
for oil New York has much lower rates, but also is the only state with significant generation from 
oil. 
     Due to New York’s rates being significantly lower compared to the other states, and New 
York generating much more electricity than New Jersey, New York’s rates are used for the 
calculations in this study, as they should provide more conservative estimates, see Table 5-22. 
5.3 NOAA Data Processing 
     Daily Temperature data was obtained from NOAA’s National Climatic Data Center (NOAA 
undated).  All weather stations in New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania were collected for 
the observation period of the study (See Map 5-23).  ArcGIS was used with county shapefiles 
from the U.S. Census to match stations to counties based on the coordinates that were given with 
the data from NOAA.  The maximum temperature and minimum temperatures are given in this 
data set in the tenths of degrees Celsius.  Temperatures were averaged by month for each county 
in New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania with available information. 
     For merging county names using ArcGIS all weather station observations with latitude and 
longitude listed as “unknown” are dropped as they cannot be mapped.  There are stations where 
the weather station identification codes appear to “move.”  For example the station coded 
GHCND:USC00286979 appears for both Pennsylvania and New Jersey. In New Jersey the code 
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reports weather from 2004 to 2007, and in Pennsylvania 2009 to 2013.  For this station due to the 
data management technique used, this station will be counted for the counties in both states in 
their respective years.   
     However, the other two stations are from counties that border each other in Pennsylvania, and 
hence are not as easily dealt with, due to the processing procedure for these files.  As a result 
these stations are assigned to one of the two counties.  Station GHCND:USC00363758 shows up 
in both Pike and Wayne County in Pennsylvania, but is named the Hawley station which is in 
Wayne County.  As a result all of these are assigned to Wayne County.  Also, there are 
observations from Wayne from 2000 to 2007 which is a longer time period than for Pike, which 
has observations reported from 2009 to 2013. Station GHCND:USC00367732 is reported as 
being in both Lancaster and York Counties in Pennsylvania.  It is only reported as being in 
Lancaster 2002 and York every year after, and it is located at the Safe Harbor Dam, which is on 
the Susquehanna River which is the border between the two counties.  All of these observations 
are assigned to York County. 
     This approach matched most of the weather data observations with counties.  There were 
1,392,101 daily observations at the weather station level in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New 
York matched this way.  Only 30,805 of these observations were not able to be matched due to 
missing location data for the weather station.  When aggregated to the monthly level, these 
observations reduced down to 21,989 observations by county for the three states.  These were not 
evenly distributed by state, which due to size differences in the states is expected.  There were 
3,132 monthly observations in New Jersey, 9,382 in New York, and 9,475 in Pennsylvania.  The 
counties with weather observation do not match up one-to-one with those for the counties where 
generation occurs. 
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     Not all counties that have power plants have a weather station.  All three states were missing 
weather data, with 6,884 missing weather observations, and 58,468 generation observations were 
matched with weather data.  Of the missing the data points, 985 missing observations were in 
New Jersey, 3,643 in New York, and 2,256 in Pennsylvania.  In New Jersey the missing data 
comes from 5 counties, Camden (102 missing temperature observations), Gloucester (247), 
Hudson (103), Ocean (98), and Salem (435).  In New York there are 6 counties missing data, 
Bronx (66 missing temperature observations), Genessee (1), Kings (1,869), Nassau (657), 
Richmond (490), and Rockland (560).  In Pennsylvania there are 10 counties with missing data, 
Greene (6 missing temperature observations), Indiana (18), Lackawanna (155), Lawrence (28), 
Montour (324), Northhampton (1,089), Northumberland (63), Schuykill (288), Venango (118), 
and Wyoming (167).  
     To reduce the number of missing observations in the data set, temperature observations from 
nearby counties are used to fill in missing data points.  The basic logic is to use an adjacent 
county with a complete set of observations which is in the same NOAA Climate Divisions7.  For 
example, Richmond County, NY (Staten Island) Queens was selected as it was the nearest 
jurisdiction with complete observations for the time period that is in the same Climate Division, 
4.  Also in New York, Westchester County was used to substitute for Rockland County, as they 
are adjacent to each and both in Division 5.  Lackawanna County is in Climate Division 1, and 
was replaced by observations from Luzerne County.  Montour County is in Climate Division 5, 
and was replaced by Lycoming County, as it was the only adjacent county with observations in 
all time periods.  Wyoming County in Climate Division 6, was replaced by observations from 
                                                          
7 The maps for New York and Pennsylvania Climate Divisions are available in the appendix, and from NOAA’s 
website at: 
http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/analysis_monitoring/regional_monitoring/CLIM_DIVS/states_counties_cl
imate-divisions.shtml 
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Sullivan County, as before, this was the only adjacent county with observations in all time 
periods.  In New Jersey 4 of the five missing counties were located in the southern part of the 
state and are in Climate division 2.  All of these counties have been assigned to Burlington 
County to replace their missing temperature observations. 
    The additional counties were mapped in the same manner.  In almost all cases an adjacent 
county in the same climate division was found (please see the Appendix for the full list of 
mappings, and for NOAA maps with climate divisions).  However, there were a few counties in 
New York that were an exception to this rule.  Lewis County is located in Division 3, but there 
are no counties in that division with full observations.  As such, Oneida County, which borders 
Lewis County, but is in Division 6 was used to fill in missing data points.  For Tompkins County 
there were no adjacent counties with all observations available.  As such Ontario County, which 
located in Division 10, same as Tompkins, is used for missing data points. 
   This procedure brought most missing observations back into the sample.  However, there 
remained 1 observations that this procedure did not reconcile.  It did not bring one observation 
for Wyoming County, Pennsylvania into the analysis.   
5.4 Census Data Processing 
     The U.S. Census Fact Finder tool was used to obtain yearly census estimates for each county 
in New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.  The data for the populations for each state came in 
two separate files.  The first file gave all of the populations from 2000 to 2010, and the second 
gave data for 2010 to 2013.  A Stata do file was written to process the file.  The population 
number in the second file was used for the 2010 observation. 
     All three states have in general had a slight increase in population.  New Jersey’s population 
has gone from 8.43 million people in 2000 to 8.9 million in 2013.  Over that same period, New 
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York’s population has gone from about 19 million to 19.65 million, and Pennsylvania’s 
population has expanded from 12.28 million people to 12.77 million.  Population varies 
significantly in each state at the county level though (see map 5-22).  For example, for 2013 New 
York, has both the lowest and highest population counties.  Hamilton County New York, in the 
Adirondack Forest Preserve had a population reported of 4,773.  While, Kings County one of the 
five boroughs of New York City, had a population of nearly 2.6 million people.  In map 5-24 we 
can see that the darker areas are more populated, while the lighter ones have very low 
population. 
Map 5-1: Generation by County Log of Total Generation for 2007, by Fossil Fuel 
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Chart 5-2: Hourly Generation (MWh) to Heat Input (mmBtu) for plant 6082 
 
Table 5-3: Fuel Mappings 
Primary Fuel Description Mapped Fuel 
Pipeline Natural Gas Gas 
Residual Oil Oil 
Coal Coal 
Diesel Oil, Pipeline Natural Gas Oil 
Diesel Oil Oil 
Diesel Oil, Other Oil Oil 
Other Oil Oil 
Natural Gas Gas 
Coal, Wood Coal 
Wood NA 
Diesel Oil, Residual Oil Oil 
Natural Gas, Pipeline Natural Gas Gas 
Other Gas Gas 
Process Gas Gas 
Coal, Coal Refuse Coal 
Coal Refuse Coal 
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Chart 5-4: Plant 2549 Observations Running for 2006 
 
 
 
Chart 5-5:Coal Units Reported Running by State by Month. 
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Chart 5-6:Gas Units Reported Running by State by Month 
 
Chart 5-7:Oil Units Reported Running by State by Month 
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Table  5-8:Pollution Rates per MWh of Electricity Generation 
State Fuel 
SO2/Gen 
(lbs/MWh) 
NOX/Gen 
(lbs/MWh) 
CO2/gen 
(tons/MWh) 
NJ Coal 10.981 4.002 1.113 
NJ Gas 0.021 0.448 0.534 
NJ Oil 4.549 2.676 0.957 
NY Coal 10.149 2.528 0.984 
NY Gas 0.068 0.392 0.599 
NY Oil 6.076 1.687 1.191 
PA Coal 12.900 2.697 0.981 
PA Gas 0.008 0.172 0.527 
PA Oil 7.664 3.002 1.637 
 
Chart 5-9:Total Generation in TWh by State 
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Chart 5-10:Fossil Generation by Fuel across states 
 
 
Chart 5-11:Fuel Prices mmBtu for Coal, Gas, and Oil 
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Chart 5-12:Monthly Heat Input million mmBtu to GWh 
 
Chart 5-13: Monthly Heat Input to GWh for Plant 50006 
 
 
 
71 
 
Table 5-14: EIA Data Boiler to Generator Association data for Plant 50006 
2011 Form EIA-860 Data - Schedule 6, 'Boiler / Generator Associations' 
UTILITY_ID PLANT_CODE BOILER_ID GENERATOR_ID GENERATOR_ASSOCIATION 
3890 50006 HRSG1 STG1 A 
3890 50006 HRSG1 STG2 A 
3890 50006 HRSG1 STG3 A 
3890 50006 HRSG2 STG1 A 
3890 50006 HRSG2 STG2 A 
3890 50006 HRSG2 STG3 A 
3890 50006 HRSG3 STG1 A 
3890 50006 HRSG3 STG2 A 
3890 50006 HRSG3 STG3 A 
3890 50006 HRSG4 STG1 A 
3890 50006 HRSG4 STG2 A 
3890 50006 HRSG4 STG3 A 
3890 50006 HRSG5 STG1 A 
3890 50006 HRSG5 STG2 A 
3890 50006 HRSG5 STG3 A 
 
Chart 5-15: Monthly Heat Input million mmBtu to GWh for all Coal Plants 
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Chart  5-16: Monthly Heat Input million mmBtu to GWh for 3179 
 
 
Chart 5-17: Monthly Heat Input million mmBtu to GWh for 54634 
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Chart 5-18: Monthly Heat Input million mmBtu to GWh for 6082 
 
 
Chart 5-19: Monthly Heat Input million mmBtu to GWh for Oil 
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Chart 5-20: Monthly Heat Input million mmBtu to GWh for 2516 
 
 
Table 5-21: Counties with Generation from AMPD not Matching NEI 
County FIPS Fuel Generation MWh 2008 Generation MWh 2011 
Cattaraugus, NY 36009 gas 285,245 148,031 
Clinton, NY 36019 gas 2,100,000 392,227 
Genesee, NY 36037 gas 4,048 56,615 
Hudson, NJ 34017 coal 2,400,000 NA 
Jefferson, NY 36045 gas 5,207 7,119 
Lebanon, PA 42075 gas 1,100,000 3,200,000 
Lewis, NY 36049 gas 10,568 2,389 
Niagara, NY 36063 gas NA 54,861 
Northumberland, PA 42097 coal 277,415 273,958 
Oneida, NY 36065 gas 2,630 3,163 
Saint Lawrence, NY 36089 gas 2,397 2,424 
Saratoga, NY 36091 gas 782,576 906,106 
Wyoming, PA 42131 gas 269,746 14,227 
Wyoming, NY 36121 gas 6,985 386,397 
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Table 5-22: Average 2008 and 2011 Generation and Yearly PM2.5 and PM10 
State Fuel 
2008 and 2011 
Generation 
GWh 
2008 and 2011 
PM2.5 tons 
PM10 minus 
PM2.5 (tons) 
PM2.5 
lbs/GWh 
PM10 
lbs/GWh 
NJ coal 9,400 2,147 31 458.63 6.57 
NY coal 28,000 1,048 2,694 74.09 190.52 
PA coal 210,000 63,625 9,977 596.96 93.61 
NJ gas 33,000 1,179 4 70.82 0.25 
NY gas 79,000 2,408 115 60.96 2.92 
PA gas 51,000 1,431 125 56.34 4.93 
NJ oil 382 112 14 587.75 75.83 
NY oil 20,000 875 223 89.67 22.85 
PA oil 1,500 253 78 329.10 101.88 
 
 
Map 5-23: Weather Stations in New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania from 2000 to 
2013 
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Map 5-24: Population by County for New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania in 2010 
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Chapter 6 RGGI’s Effects on Health 
     To be able to assess the health effects of RGGI a series of methodological steps must be 
made.  First, it is necessary to estimate the effects on generation.  There are two ways that RGGI 
can affect the behavior of power plants: by changing their decisions on when to produce 
electricity, and by changing the overall level of electricity generated.  This analysis utilizes a 
Tobit random effects model for making estimates.  The coefficients from this method are used to 
determine the effects of RGGI on generation at the county level. Following discussion of the 
generation calculations, the method for aggregating and valuing RGGI’s health effects is 
presented.  This step aggregates the changes in generation by plant and fuel and applies 
emissions coefficients to estimate overall changes in SO2, NOX, PM25, and PM10 by county.  
These changes are then monetized using marginal damage estimates from Muller (2014).  Total 
observed reductions are also calculated and presented, to better understand what has actually 
happened to generation in the states in the study. 
6.1 Estimating the Effect of RGGI on Generation 
     The data set was split into two seasons, and the regressions were run separately on those sets.  
The two seasons were summer and all other months (not summer).  These time periods were 
selected because: (1) there are practical reasons why the generation equations would be different 
due to different levels of demand and (2) at the national level there are seasonal programs to 
control ozone, which is not as much of a concern in the cooler months.  Also, a Chow test 
showed that the coefficients for fuel price and generation from gas were different for the two 
regressions at a 5 percent confidence level, and that the coefficient for generation from coal was 
different for the two regressions at a 10 percent level.   
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6.1.1 Tobit Random Effects Model 
    The decision to run a power plant on a given day is complex, depending on the fuel used, time 
of year, anticipated demand, and characteristics of the individual plants such as age and 
technology.  There are fixed costs of bringing a generator online so firms will only do it when 
the unit’s generation is expected to exceed a threshold.  Vella (1998) provides a survey of 
methods for correcting for selection bias.  He reviews parametric, semi-parametric, and non-
parametric methods.  Two parametric methods that are often considered are the Tobit and 
Heckman (or Heckit) models. 
    Heckman (1976, 1979) corrects for selection bias by first creating a term to estimate the 
likelihood that an observation occurs in the sample. His approach uses the inverse Mill’s ratio 
(λi) which Heckman points out has “several interesting properties” which are: 
(1) Its denominator is the probability that observation i has data for Yi. 
(2) The lower the probability that an observation has data on Yi the greater the value of λ[i] 
for that observation (1976, p. 479). 
Probit can be used to obtain a consistent estimation of the inverse Mill’s ratio (Heckman 1976, p. 
481).  However, one drawback of the Heckman approach is that it relies on normality and 
produces inconsistent estimators if this assumption fails (Vella, 1998, p. 131).  Also, the 
Heckman approach requires variables that can be included in the selection equation that are not 
included in the effects model, but “there are frequently few candidates” in terms of variables that 
can be excluded from the effects model (Vella, 1998, p. 135).   
     There are other parametric, semi-parametric, and non-parametric approaches to estimating 
selection bias.  For example Wooldridge (1995) and Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) have 
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presented adaptations of the Heckman approach to be used with panel datasets with fixed effects.   
However, this type of approach required large amounts of computing power to employ.       
    There are potential problems with Tobit approach also.  “Theoretically the standard Tobit 
model is applicable only if the underlying dependent variable contains negative values that have 
been censored to zero in the empirical realization of the variable” (Sigelman, and Zeng, p. 167, 
1999).  Ideally a fixed effects approach would be used to be able to control for estimations in this 
analysis.   However, the Tobit model has problems because it uses a maximum likelihood 
estimator approach, and these suffer from bias when utilizing fixed effects.  As Greene states, 
“The MLE/FEs of the slopes in the Tobit model seem not to be biased in either direction. 
However, the MLE/FE of the variance parameter in the Tobit model seems to be biased 
downward” (Greene, 2004, p. 127).  The Heckman fixed effect approach also had problems in 
that when the fixed effects are added the regression for the summer fails to converge after 100 
iterations. 
    Ultimately, a number of factors influenced which model was selected for this study.  Besides 
the considerations given above, the data has a large amount of observations clustered at zero as 
can be seen in the histogram of the PDF see chart 6-1.  Also, using the Heckman approach has 
proved to be infeasible due to problems with the model converging when capacity was controlled 
for in the effects equation as well as the selection equation.  Due to these reasons, it was 
determined that the best approach to use was the Tobit model controlling for Random Effects at 
the county level. 
     The Tobit selection model describing a county’s generation takes the form of: 
6.1 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾𝑇𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,   if yi,t > 2000. 
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      𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 0 otherwise 
      The regressors vary based on different dimensions, and as such are broken up into three 
different vectors.  The X vector contains the variables that change over both time and geography.  
Specifically, it contains variables for temperature (maximum and minimum), county population, 
the fuel dummies for coal and gas, and the RGGI interaction dummies.  There are three variables 
for testing the interaction of RGGI with the three fuel types in the analysis, RGGI coal, RGGI, 
gas, and RGGI oil.  The V vector contains the variables that vary by geography, but are set in 
time.  These geography varying variables are the county dummies, and the average plant age in a 
county for each fuel source.  For this analysis the plant age is set based on how old a plant was in 
2014.  The T vector consists of variables that change over time.  Specifically, this vector 
contains the monthly fuel price for coal, gas, and oil, and year dummies for 2001 to 2013. 
6.2 Results for Summer 
    The parameter estimates for the Tobit random effects equation for summer are shown in Table 
6-2.  In the summer regression, neither the maximum or minimum temperature coefficients are 
statistically significant.  However, both coefficients are positive as would be expected.  The 
population coefficient is positive and significant at the 5 percent level, and indicates that for 
every million people in a county, there is likely to be over 380,000 MWh of greater generation.   
For each year older the average age of units in a county are, the predicted generation falls by 
over 2,700 MWh, and is significant at the 1 percent level.  Higher fuel price are also associated 
with lower generation for a fuel at the county level.  For each dollar per mmBtu in price that a 
fuel rises, the model predicts a fall in generation of over 15,000 MWh, and is significant at the 1 
percent level.  Lastly, as the capacity of generation increases, generation will increase.  The 
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capacity in mmBtu shows that for every mmBtu of generation capacity, there will be an increase 
of about 35MWh in generation, which is significant at the 1 percent level. 
     The fuel coefficients are the most interesting ones for this study, as they allow us to 
understand the effects of RGGI.  For the fuel variables both coal and gas are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels respectively.  Both fuels generate more electricity 
compared to oil, coal producing nearly 230,000 MWh more than oil, and gas producing 
approximately 78,000 MWh more than oil.  When RGGI is introduced both coal and oil 
generation fall, by over 88,000 and 89,000 MWh in a county respectively.  Both variables are 
significant at the 1 percent level.  RGGI has a different impact on gas generation, while not 
statically significant, the coefficient for gas is positive.  During the summer months, RGGI has a 
large negative impact on coal and oil generation, which is not seen for gas generation.  The 
overall, Sigma u, and panel-level variance, Sigma e, components indicate that about 40 percent 
of the variance is panel-level. 
6.3 Results for Other Seasons     
      The parameter estimates for the Tobit random effects equation for non-summer months are 
shown in Table 6-3.  In the non-summer regression, unlike above, both the maximum or 
minimum temperature coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  For the 
maximum temperature the model shows a negative correlation with generation, as the 
temperature goes up 1/10th of a degrees centigrade, there is a reduction in generation by about 
450 MWh, and generation goes up by the same amount for the minimum temperature variable.  
The population coefficient, like above, is positive and significant at the 5 percent level, and 
indicates that for every million people in a county, there is likely to be over 245,000 MWh more 
generation.  For each year older the average age of units in a county are, the predicted generation 
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falls by over 3,500 MWh, more than during the summer, and is significant at the 1 percent level.  
Again, higher fuel price are also associated with lower generation for a fuel at the county level.  
For each dollar per mmBtu in price that a fuel rises, the model predicts a fall in generation of 
over 18,000 MWh, and is significant at the 1 percent level.  Further, as the capacity of generation 
increases, generation will increase.  The capacity in mmBtu shows that for every mmBtu of 
generation capacity, there will be an increase of about 31 MWh in generation, and this variable is 
again significant at the 1 percent level. 
     The fuel coefficients are qualitatively similar to those for the summer months.  For the fuel 
variables both coal and gas are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  Both fuels generate 
more electricity compared to oil, coal producing over 309,000 MWh more than oil, and gas 
producing over 111,000 MWh more than oil.  When RGGI is introduced both coal and oil 
generation fall, by over 105,000 and 88,000 MWh respectively.  Both variables are significant at 
the 1 percent level.  For the non-summer months, the RGGI impact on gas is significant at the 10 
percent level, and shows that gas generation will increase by over 10,000 MWh a month.  The 
coefficients again demonstrate that when RGGI is introduced there will be a shifting in 
electricity generation away from coal and oil, and towards gas.  The overall, Sigma u, and panel-
level variance, Sigma e, components indicate that about a third of the variance is panel-level. 
6.4 Linking Changes in Generation to Effects on Health 
     RGGI’s effects on health were calculated for each of the models above using a four-step 
process.  First, fitted values for generation at each location were compared with counterfactual 
values obtained by setting the RGGI variables in each equation to zero.  Second, these changes 
were aggregated to the county level (not necessary for the county-level model).  Third, county-
level changes in generation were used to compute changes in emissions of NOX, SO2, PM2.5 and 
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PM10.  Finally, these changes were monetized using county-specific marginal damages taken 
from Muller (2014).  This section presents the steps in detail. 
Let expected generation by unit i in county c using fuel f at time t be 𝑦𝑖,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡
∗ .  Aggregating 
to the county level by summing over by unit, and time period gives overall fitted county 
generation:   
6.5 𝐶𝐺∗𝑐,𝑓 =  ∑ 𝑦
∗
𝑖,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡𝑖,𝑡
 
Next, the counter-factual generation, y*CF, was calculated by setting the RGGI fuel interaction 
dummy variables, RGGI_Coal, RGGI_Gas, and RGGI_Oil, to 0 and predicting generation levels 
again.  Again these values were aggregated to the county level, giving us the counterfactual 
county generation: 
6.6 𝐶𝐺∗𝐶𝐹𝑐,𝑓 =  ∑ 𝑦
∗𝐶𝐹
𝑖,𝑐,𝑓,𝑡𝑖,𝑡
 
     For each county the RGGI effect by fuel is thus: 
6.7  𝑅𝐺𝐺𝐼_𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑐,𝑓 =  𝐶𝐺
∗𝐶𝐹
𝑐,𝑓 −  𝐶𝐺
∗
𝑐,𝑓 
     As shown in Equation 6.8, changes in emissions are calculated by multiplying RGGI’s 
generation effect by the average CO2, NOX, and SO2 emissions rates for each fuel using the 
average EPA emissions coefficients presented in Chapter 5, in sections 5.1.3.  This approach was 
used rather than unit-specific emissions rates because no data was available on units that did not 
run.  The rates are similar to overall estimates from the EPA (see Table 6-4).  Section 5.2 shows 
the emission rates used for PM2.5 and PM10 (Table 6-5)  
6.8 Emissionsf,c =  RGGI_Generation_Effectf,c ∗ Emission_Ratef 
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     Changes in emissions were then converted to monetized changes in health using location-
specific damages from Muller’s (2014) APEEP, or AP2, model8.  This approach is used due to 
the thoroughness of his model, and because it has marginal damages available at the county 
level.  Muller’s model makes use of highly detailed information about specific pollutant sources: 
“nearly 10,000 individual and grouped sources are attributed a unique marginal damage” 
(Muller, 2014, p. 472) and uses air transport modeling to predict changes in ambient 
concentrations of pollutants resulting from emissions in different counties.  Muller then uses 
“[c]ounty-level inventories of people, agricultural crops and commercial timber” with these 
ambient concentration levels to predict exposure rates (2014, p. 473).  These rates are then used 
to estimate the change in morbidity and mortality rates resulting from exposure to these 
pollutants, as well as the other relatively minor damages mentioned above.  Finally, the changes 
in rates are monetized, giving a marginal damage cost for each county of each of the following 
pollutants: NH3 (ammonia), PM 2.5 and PM10, NOX, SO2, and VOC (volatile organic 
compounds, a precursor to ozone) (Muller, 2014).  Table 6-6 presents the top 20 counties in 
terms of SO2 marginal damages, and Table 6-7 has the top 20 counties in terms of NOX marginal 
damages, as estimated by Muller (2014).  As can be seen in in Tables 6-6 and 6-7, the damages 
are most severe in urban areas where there is high population density. 
     To calculate the net health benefits, B, for county c, the county’s emissions are summed over 
fuel types f and then multiplied by Muller’s marginal damages for the county (referred to here as 
Muller’s Marginal Damages  or MMD).   
6.9 𝐵𝑐 = ∑ 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑓,𝑐 ∗𝑓  𝑀𝑀𝐷𝑐 
                                                          
8 APEEP model information is available from Nick Muller’s webpage: 
https://sites.google.com/site/nickmullershomepage/home/ap2-apeep-model-2 and allows for replication of Muller 
2014. 
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6.5 Historical Change Effects on Health 
     To get a sense of how RGGI fits into the overall changes, comparing generation and pollution 
for periods both before and after RGGI for the states in the study is helpful.  A three-year period 
before RGGI, 2005 to 2007, is compared with a three-year period with RGGI in effect, 2011 to 
2013.  This comparison is made by two different approaches.  The first approach aggregates 
generation by fuel type for each state over both periods, and presents the generation differences 
and pollution estimates for each state.  The second approach estimates potential changes due to 
individual plant changes in generation and in frequency of operation. The results are presented 
for summer and non-summer months to be more comparable to the results from the regressions 
presented in this chapter. 
6.5.1 Historical Changes in the Summer 
     As shown in Table 6-8, historical average summer changes between these two periods show 
that there were large differences in generation for these states.  As discussed in the data 
construction chapter, this was not unexpected.  The changes in Table 6-8 show each state had 
large reductions in the average amount of generation, and associated pollution, during the 
summer.  New York’s overall reduction in fossil fuel generation was over ten times as much as 
Pennsylvania’s even though Pennsylvania generates much more electricity with fossil fuels than 
New York.  In Table 6-9 we can see that the changes vary by fuel.  In New Jersey the generation 
falls for each fuel class considered in the analysis, while for both New York and Pennsylvania 
coal and oil generation falls while gas generation increases.  As a result, all of the states in the 
analysis see a large decrease in CO2, NOX, SO2, PM10, and PM2.5 emitted. 
     The second way of analyzing the changes for each state is to decompose total changes in 
generation into two components.  The first component is the “intensity” change, or the change 
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due to raising or lowering a running plant’s output.  The second component is the “switching” 
change, which is the change in generation due to a plant switching on or off.  
     These components are derived by defining the total generation, Q, for a time period as: 
6.10 𝑄𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖 × 𝐴𝑖 
Where n is the number of months that the plant runs in the time period and A is the average 
monthly generation in MWh.  With some simple algebra it can be shown that the change in 
generation, ∆𝑄, between the two periods can be decomposed as follows: 
6.11 ∆𝑄 = 𝑛2 × 𝐴2 −  𝑛1 × 𝐴1 
6.12 ∆𝑄 = 𝑛2 × 𝐴2 −  𝑛1 × 𝐴1 + (𝑛2 × 𝐴1 −  𝑛2 × 𝐴1) 
6.13 ∆𝑄 = 𝑛2 × ∆𝐴 +  ∆𝑛 × 𝐴1 
Where n2*ΔA is the change in intensity for plants running in period 2, and Δn*A1 is the 
switching part of the change for plants running in period 1.  The results of these calculations for 
the summer can be found in Table 6-10 below.  As can be seen in the table, there were 
significant decreases for coal and oil in all three states in the analysis.  Also, while the overall 
change in gas was positive for all three states, there were differences in the mix of intensity and 
switching changes.  For New Jersey and New York both the switching and intensity components 
of the changes were positive, while for Pennsylvania the switching component was negative 
while the intensity change was positive. 
6.5.2 Historical Changes in Other Months  
    For the non-summer months there have also been large reductions in overall generation for all 
three states (see Table 6-11).  Again, the largest overall reduction came in New York.  In all 
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three states there were reductions in generation from coal and oil, and increases in generation 
from gas.  All states saw large reductions in emissions of CO2, SO2, NOX, PM10, and PM2.5.  
While Pennsylvania saw growth in overall generation, it was due to the increases in gas out 
pacing the decreases in oil and coal, which can be seen in Table 6-12. 
    As with the summer data, each state’s generation change was also broken down into 
components due to switching and intensity changes.  These components have a slightly different 
pattern than seen above for the summer. Both components of generation change for coal and oil 
are negative for all states (see Table 6-13).  Also, all states have positive components for gas. 
6.5.3 Total Value of Historical Changes 
These changes in generation and pollution result in significant improvements in terms of health 
effects for all three states in the study.  All three states had positive overall effects.  The largest 
overall value gain occurred in New York, which is estimated to have over $1.189 billion worth 
of positive health impacts yearly.  Pennsylvania is estimated to have over $741 million worth of 
positive health impacts, and New Jersey is estimated to have nearly $267 million.  Most of the 
value comes from reductions in SO2 compared to NOX, PM10, or PM2.5 (see Table 6-14). 
     The monetary value of the health changes that result from these changes in pollution levels 
vary by location and can be negative as well as positive.  The largest negative value occurs in 
Bucks County, Pennsylvania, which had over $7 million worth of damages.  While the largest 
value occurs in Queens which saw a large amount of oil generation go off line with over $759 
million worth of benefits.  Results for all three states are presented in Tables 6-15, 6-16, and 6-17 
below.  New Jersey and New York are of particular interest as the changes they experienced 
place an upper bound on the effect of RGGI. As mentioned above, this provides a check on the 
benefits estimated in this study. 
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6.6 Conclusion Regarding RGGI’s Health Effects 
     The Tobit model described above in section 6.1.1 with the results presented in sections 6.2 
and 6.3, was used also linked with health benefits using the method described in section 6.4.  
Overall, the model predicts over $60 million in annual benefits in New Jersey, and nearly $70 
million in benefits in New York from RGGI. Between New Jersey and New York, the total 
estimated RGGI benefits under the county-level Tobit model account for approximately 9% of 
the benefits from the total change for those two states.  The benefits were not evenly distributed 
within the two states (see Tables 6-18 and 6-19).  While some counties have large benefits there 
are some counties that suffer damages due to RGGI, due to increased gas generation occurring in 
their boundaries.  Not all counties benefit from RGGI, as can be seen in table 6-18, the largest 
damages occur in Bergen County New Jersey, which has over $600,000 worth damages.  
However, the overall benefits greatly outweigh the damages. 
     Mercer County in New Jersey had the largest overall value from changes due to RGGI at over 
$29 million worth of estimated benefits, the overall average yearly change in this time period 
was approximately $95 million.  Queens is predicted to have the largest total benefit in New 
York, approximately $20 million.  This is due to the large reductions in generation from oil 
which occurred there.  The total change in value of health damages for Queens during this time is 
estimated at over $700 million, so this is feasible.  Overall, the benefits outside those two 
counties are largely concentrated in the western counties of New York, south central New York, 
and near New York City (which are largely from Queens).  Most of New Jersey's benefits occur 
in Mercer and Hudson, and most benefits occur in the central and southern part of the state.  Map 
6-20 also demonstrates that the vast majority of benefits come for SO2 reductions, as opposed to 
the other pollutants. 
 
 
89 
 
     In summary, an important side effect of programs to reduce CO2 emissions is the ancillary 
benefits the produce as a result of reductions in coal and oil combustion.  Previously, Burtraw, et 
al. estimated that ancillary health benefits from a $25 per ton carbon tax would be approximately 
$8 per metric ton of carbon for reductions in NOX abated (1997 dollars) though their model did 
not predict aggregate reductions in SO2 (p. 651, 2003).  The present study estimates benefits of 
approximately $26 per short ton ($29 per metric ton) of carbon avoided in benefits from NOX, 
SO2, PM2.5, and PM10 reductions.  Most of the benefits coming from reductions in SO2, which 
accounted for approximately $24 per short ton of benefits.  The benefits are large despite the 
much lower auction prices of RGGI allowances, which had a maximum value of less than $4 
over the study period.  However, while the Muller marginal damages are mostly due to negative 
health impacts, they do include more than just the health effects used in Burtraw et al., and are 
also specific to an area that is likely to have higher than average damages due to its high 
population density. 
Chart 6-1: Probability Distribution Function of Generation Data 
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Table 6-2: Tobit Random Effects County Summer Months 
Number of observations = 5050 
Number of groups = 123 
Wald chi2(105) = 3245.00 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.000 
Log Likelihood = -50919.293       
  Coefficient Standard Error  
Temp Max 37 .98 172 .52 
Temp Min 64 .67 193 .17 
Population 384667 .6** 156118 .20 
Coal 229063 .39*** 33411 .46 
Gas 77726 .39** 36824 .53 
RGGI Coal -88148 .15*** 12176 .56 
RGGI Gas 6071 .98 8476 .68 
RGGI Oil -89554 .05*** 14400 .28 
Age -2734 .61** 1123 .99 
Fuel Price -15718 .01*** 1282 .20 
Capacity (mmBtu) 35 .82*** 1 .21 
sigma u 91151 .94*** 6191 .70 
sigma e 111603 .63*** 1294 .63 
Rho 0 .400 0 .033 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
NOTE: Yearly and county dummy variables not shown. 
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Table 6-3: Tobit Random Effects for Non-Summer Months 
Number of observations = 15079 
Number of groups = 123 
Wald chi2(105) = 4110.82 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.000 
Log Likelihood = -126133.36     
  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Temp Max -447 .248*** 83 .474 
Temp Min 458 .887*** 96 .378 
Population 245461 .3** 115349 .4 
Coal 309062 .8*** 33707 .33 
Gas 111592 .8*** 35348 .96 
RGGI Coal -105218 .1*** 8650 .804 
RGGI Gas 10635 .84* 6088 .894 
RGGI Oil -88767 .9*** 11857 .94 
Age -3531 .642*** 982 .663 
Fuel Price -18313 .7*** 958 .336 
Capacity (mmBtu) 31 .045*** 0 .940 
sigma u 93422 .02*** 6191 .70 
sigma e 131217 .0*** 1294 .63 
Rho 0 .336 968 .3724 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
NOTE: Yearly and county dummy variables not shown. 
 
Table 6-4: Emissions Rates for SO2, NOX, and CO2 
State Fuel 
SO2 
lbs/Mwh 
NOX 
lbs/MWh 
CO2 
tons/MWh State Fuel 
SO2 
lbs/MWh 
NOX 
lbs/MWh 
CO2 
tons/MWh 
NJ coal 10.98 4.00 1.11  PA coal 12.90 2.70 0.98 
NJ gas 0.02 0.45 0.53  PA gas 0.01 0.17 0.53 
NJ oil 4.55 2.68 0.96  PA oil 7.66 3.00 1.64 
NY coal 10.15 2.53 0.98  EPA coal 13.00 6.00 1.12 
NY gas 0.07 0.39 0.60  EPA gas 0.10 1.70 0.57 
NY oil 6.08 1.69 1.19  EPA oil 12.00 4.00 0.84 
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Table 6-5: Emission Rates for PM2.5 and PM10 
State Fuel 
PM2.5 
lbs/GWh 
PM10 
lbs/GWh 
NJ coal 458.63 6.57 
NY coal 74.09 190.52 
PA coal 596.96 93.61 
NJ gas 70.82 0.25 
NY gas 60.96 2.92 
PA gas 56.34 4.93 
NJ oil 587.75 75.83 
NY oil 89.67 22.85 
PA oil 329.10 101.88 
 
Table 6-6: Top 20 Marginal Damage Counties for SO2 (from Muller 2014) 
State County NOX SO2 
 California Los Angeles County $109 $43,344 
 New York Queens County $3,855 $22,109 
 New York Kings County $3,422 $17,878 
 New Jersey Bergen County $3,516 $17,359 
 California San Diego County $120 $14,459 
 New Jersey Essex County $2,311 $12,372 
 New York Nassau County $1,910 $12,337 
 New Jersey Hudson County $2,450 $12,281 
 California Orange County -$204 $11,905 
 California Contra Costa County $556 $10,157 
 New Jersey Union County $1,742 $10,128 
 New York New York County $1,461 $9,888 
 District of 
Columbia 
District of Columbia $96 $9,814 
 California Riverside County $181 $9,183 
 New Jersey Passaic County $1,531 $8,849 
 California Santa Clara County $220 $8,513 
 California San Francisco County $308 $8,305 
 New Jersey Morris County $1,283 $8,304 
 New York Bronx County $1,099 $8,258 
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Table 6-7: Top 20 Marginal Damage Counties for NOX (from Muller 2014) 
State County NOX SO2 
 New York Queens County $3,855 $22,109 
 Minnesota Anoka County $3,582 $6,653 
 New Jersey Bergen County $3,516 $17,359 
 Minnesota Hennepin County $3,477 $6,644 
 New York Kings County $3,422 $17,878 
 Minnesota Wright County $2,714 $5,074 
 Minnesota Ramsey County $2,578 $5,167 
 New Jersey Hudson County $2,450 $12,281 
 Minnesota Dakota County $2,408 $4,784 
 New Jersey Essex County $2,311 $12,372 
 Minnesota Washington County $2,269 $4,568 
 Missouri Perry County $2,197 $4,284 
 Illinois Randolph County $2,095 $4,095 
 Texas Fort Bend County $1,971 $6,201 
 New York Nassau County $1,910 $12,337 
 Missouri Jackson County $1,869 $1,309 
 Missouri St. Louis County $1,858 $3,913 
 Missouri Clay County $1,846 $1,269 
 New Jersey Union County $1,742 $10,128 
 
 
Table 6-8: Average Yearly Generation and Pollution Change for Summer Months State 
Totals 
State 
Change in 
Generation  
Change in 
CO2 
Change in 
SO2  
Change in 
NOX 
Change in 
PM10 
Change in 
PM2.5 
NJ -553,486 -1,137,384 -10,250 -3,703 -133 -29 
NY -4,652,997 -6,280,744 -53,500 -18,500 -487 -227 
PA -419,989 -3,775,175 -42,550 -14,200 -590 -59 
Total -5,626,472 -11,193,303 -106,300 -36,403 -1,211 -315 
Note: Generation in MWh, CO2, SO2, NOX, PM10, and PM25 are all given in short tons. 
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Table 6-9: Average Yearly Generation and Pollution Change for Summer Months by Fuel 
and State 
State Fuel 
Change in 
Generation  
Change in 
CO2 
Change 
in SO2  
Change 
in NOX 
Change 
in PM10 
Change 
in PM2.5 
NJ coal -1,391,154 -1,558,093 -9,050 -4,173 -133 -51 
NJ gas 1,047,897 597,302 52 891 2 32 
NJ oil -210,230 -176,593 -1,261 -420 -2 -9 
NY coal -4,714,499 -5,280,239 -30,650 -14,150 -449 -174 
NY gas 3,896,912 2,221,240 195 3,312 6 119 
NY oil -3,835,410 -3,221,744 -23,000 -7,650 -44 -172 
PA coal -6,243,366 -6,992,570 -40,600 -18,750 -595 -231 
PA gas 6,200,896 3,534,510 310 5,250 9 189 
PA oil -377,518 -317,115 -2,265 -755 -4 -17 
Note: Generation in MWh, CO2, SO2, NOX, PM10, and PM25 are all given in short tons. 
 
Table 6-10: Average Yearly Generation Switch and Intensity Changes 
State Fuel 
Total Change in 
Generation (MWh) 
Generation 
Switch Change 
Generation 
Intensity Change 
NJ coal -1,391,154 -287,154 -1,104,000 
NJ gas 1,047,897 41,866 1,006,031 
NJ oil -210,230 -76,816 -133,414 
NY coal -4,714,499 -2,781,874 -1,932,626 
NY gas 3,896,912 195,320 3,701,592 
NY oil -3,835,410 -2,190,923 -1,644,487 
PA coal -6,243,366 -2,481,471 -3,761,894 
PA gas 6,200,896 -30,648 6,231,544 
PA oil -377,518 -121,237 -256,281 
  Total -5,626,472 -7,732,937 2,106,465 
 
Figure 6-11: Average Yearly Generation and Pollution Change for Non-Summer Months 
State Totals 
State 
Change in 
Generation  
Change in 
CO2 
Change 
in SO2  
Change 
in NOX 
Change 
in PM10 
Change 
in PM2.5 
NJ -516,649 -2,922,039 -31,150 -10,700 -445 -48 
NY -10,626,245 -15,700,000 -137,000 -47,350 -1,345 -533 
PA 1,373,062 -11,000,000 -139,500 -45,050 -1,995 -103 
Total -9,769,832 -29,622,039 -307,650 -103,100 -3,785 -683 
      Note: Generation in MWh, CO2, SO2, NOX, PM10, and PM25 are all given in short tons. 
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Table 6-12: Average Yearly Generation and Pollution Change for Non-Summer Months 
Fuel by State 
State Fuel 
Change in 
Generation  
Change in 
CO2 
Change 
in SO2  
Change 
in NOX 
Change 
in PM10 
Change 
in PM2.5 
NJ coal -4,726,322 -5,293,480 -30,700 -14,200 -450 -175 
NJ gas 4,313,644 2,458,777 216 3,667 6 132 
NJ oil -103,971 -87,336 -624 -208 -1 -5 
NY coal -13,256,968 -14,800,000 -86,000 -39,750 -1,263 -491 
NY gas 11,182,374 6,373,953 559 9,500 16 341 
NY oil -8,551,651 -7,183,387 -51,500 -17,100 -97 -383 
PA coal -21,235,240 -23,800,000 -138,000 -63,500 -2,024 -786 
PA gas 23,082,771 13,200,000 1,154 19,600 34 704 
PA oil -474,468 -398,553 -2,847 -949 -5 -21 
    Note: Generation in MWh, CO2, SO2, NOX, PM10, and PM25 are all given in short tons. 
 
Table 6-13: Average Yearly Generation Switch and Intensity Changes 
State Fuel 
Total Change in 
Generation 
(MWh) 
Generation 
Switch 
Change 
Generation 
Intensity 
Change NJ coal -4,726,322 -2,312,618 -2,413,703 
NJ gas 4,313,644 441,285 3,872,358 
NJ oil -103,971 -74,212 -29,759 
NY coal -13,256,968 -8,171,759 -5,085,209 
NY gas 11,182,374 1,214,080 9,968,294 
NY oil -8,551,651 -5,079,630 -3,472,021 
PA coal -21,235,240 -8,608,379 -12,626,861 
PA gas 23,082,771 477,373 22,605,398 
PA oil -474,468 -89,983 -384,485 
  Total -9,769,831 -22,203,843 12,434,012 
 
Table 6-14: Average Yearly Value of SO2 and NOX Changes 
State SO2 NOX PM10 PM25 Total 
NJ $258,500,000 $8,989,000 $1,321,000 -$1,831,000 $266,978,000 
NY $1,139,000,000 $39,300,000 $1,462,000 $10,216,000 $1,189,978,000 
PA $722,000,000 $18,460,000 $2,074,000 -$1,531,000 $741,003,000 
Total $2,119,500,000 $66,748,000 $4,858,000 $6,853,000 $2,197,959,000 
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Table 6-15: Average Yearly Monetary Value of Changes by County for New Jersey 
State County SO2 NOX PM10 PM2.5 Total 
NJ Atlantic $40,586 $1,261 $16 $752 $42,615 
NJ Bergen -$986,870 -$3,398,316 -$11,694 -$2,507,962 -$6,904,843 
NJ Burlington $294,176 $51,968 $403 $75,120 $421,668 
NJ Camden -$68,214 -$83,501 -$687 -$165,810 -$318,212 
NJ Cape May $22,020,590 $978,378 $51,587 $266,038 $23,316,593 
NJ Cumberland $1,898,853 $66,295 $3,941 $14,994 $1,984,084 
NJ Essex -$228,309 -$725,133 -$2,738 -$604,440 -$1,560,620 
NJ Gloucester $26,170 $34,472 $194 $46,885 $107,720 
NJ Hudson $126,600,000 $10,472,092 $874,450 $2,230,851 $140,177,393 
NJ Hunterdon $17,004 $36,766 $130 $30,246 $84,146 
NJ Mercer $89,200,000 $4,474,216 $365,703 $1,621,798 $95,661,717 
NJ Middlesex $7,858,732 -$638,908 $1,496 -$635,082 $6,586,237 
NJ Ocean $316,296 -$74,945 -$186 -$79,916 $161,250 
NJ Salem $12,510,242 $455,137 $48,736 $121,783 $13,135,898 
NJ Union -$910,299 -$2,661,005 -$10,021 -$2,246,923 -$5,828,249 
  Total $258,588,956 $8,988,778 $1,321,329 -$1,831,664 $267,067,399 
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Table 6-16: Average Yearly Monetary Value of Changes by County for New York 
State County SO2 NOX PM10 PM2.5 Total 
NY Albany -$42,797 -$85,740 -$714 -$189,055 -$318,306 
NY Allegany $2,400 $4,002 $9 $2,178 $8,589 
NY Bronx $31,426 $71,095 $388 $82,472 $185,381 
NY Broome $963 $1,336 $5 $1,211 $3,515 
NY Cattaraugus $390 $498 $2 $502 $1,392 
NY Chautauqua $30,665,403 $1,348,047 $52,170 $245,095 $32,310,716 
NY Clinton $62,096 $93,100 $260 $61,282 $216,738 
NY Erie $26,040,674 $960,708 $75,473 $380,223 $27,457,079 
NY Genesee -$2,611 -$6,744 -$13 -$3,241 -$12,609 
NY Greene -$40,625 -$35,196 -$245 -$61,675 -$137,739 
NY Herkimer $886 $1,031 $4 $987 $2,908 
NY Jefferson $25,641,902 $1,015,411 $46,709 $213,334 $26,917,357 
NY Kings $9,745,837 $1,149,087 $10,957 $813,852 $11,719,732 
NY Lewis $1,370 $1,689 $5 $1,292 $4,355 
NY Monroe $14,792,083 $605,878 $45,079 $217,727 $15,660,768 
NY Nassau $963,716 $703,281 $3,657 $692,553 $2,363,207 
NY New York -$125,288 -$540,640 -$2,755 -$553,065 -$1,221,748 
NY Niagara $34,498,948 $1,683,059 $77,704 $420,704 $36,680,415 
NY Oneida $108 $139 $0 $123 $372 
NY Onondaga $32,634 $41,174 $178 $45,586 $119,573 
NY Orange $88,800,000 $4,734,868 $206,103 $1,527,568 $95,268,539 
NY Oswego $4,325,054 -$169,703 $394 -$213,961 $3,941,784 
NY Queens $733,000,000 $21,033,603 $588,029 $4,812,888 $759,434,520 
NY Rensselaer -$299,555 -$270,524 -$1,890 -$474,421 -$1,046,390 
NY Richmond -$98,323 -$231,993 -$1,077 -$233,681 -$565,075 
NY Rockland $84,400,000 $5,453,862 $273,240 $1,308,243 $91,435,345 
NY 
Saint 
Lawrence $1,984 $3,013 $6 $1,373 $6,375 
NY Saratoga -$14,189 -$14,546 -$81 -$20,025 -$48,841 
NY Suffolk $59,400,000 $488,659 $27,924 $852,858 $60,769,441 
NY Tompkins $19,007,892 $747,407 $43,442 $200,559 $19,999,300 
NY Wyoming $1,732 $3,556 $7 $1,870 $7,165 
NY Yates $7,655,334 $425,161 $17,193 $80,492 $8,178,180 
  Total $1,138,449,445 $39,214,578 $1,462,163 $10,215,849 $1,189,342,035 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
Table 6-17: Average Yearly Monetary Value of Changes by County for Pennsylvania 
State County SO2 NOX PM10 PM2.5 Total 
PA Adams -$375,266 -$791,341 -$1,934 -$489,745 -$1,658,286 
PA Allegheny $6,373,797 -$112,692 $19,014 -$578,062 $5,702,057 
PA Armstrong $55,100,000 $2,227,946 $113,622 $559,410 $58,000,977 
PA Beaver $8,560,634 $363,090 $21,821 $114,337 $9,059,882 
PA Berks $31,678,003 $835,932 $90,443 -$214,788 $32,389,590 
PA Bucks -$1,555,689 -$2,091,217 -$14,193 -$3,496,875 -$7,157,975 
PA Cambria -$1,822,659 -$69,695 -$4,142 -$21,630 -$1,918,126 
PA Chester $29,899,654 $1,093,358 $86,814 $509,861 $31,589,686 
PA Clarion $1,145,338 $48,426 $2,271 $11,333 $1,207,368 
PA Clearfield $33,777,758 $1,410,771 $58,976 $286,429 $35,533,934 
PA Cumberland $58,531 $2,591 $19 $910 $62,051 
PA Delaware $110,800,000 $2,202,223 $490,142 $327,647 $113,820,012 
PA Erie $2,910 $5,018 $12 $3,303 $11,243 
PA Fayette -$476,269 -$701,466 -$1,900 -$523,169 -$1,702,804 
PA Franklin $12,086 $25,173 $52 $13,184 $50,495 
PA Greene -$3,688,779 -$142,974 -$7,815 -$39,801 -$3,879,369 
PA Indiana $130,300,000 $3,830,219 $317,448 $1,688,017 $136,135,684 
PA Lackawanna $1,307 $2,550 $7 $1,830 $5,694 
PA Lawrence $17,204,198 $858,979 $38,956 $204,260 $18,306,393 
PA Lebanon -$355,398 -$798,669 -$2,043 -$534,147 -$1,690,258 
PA Luzerne $6,133,874 $163,783 $15,750 -$3,187 $6,310,221 
PA Montour $49,742,701 $3,265,514 $129,908 $666,661 $53,804,784 
PA Northampton $89,500,000 $1,222,304 $294,691 -$1,391,559 $89,625,436 
PA Northumberland $476,788 $27,757 $1,133 $5,589 $511,266 
PA Philadelphia $3,387,002 -$81,119 $798 -$370,605 $2,936,077 
PA Schuylkill $61,262 $3,468 $167 $820 $65,716 
PA Venango $230 $381 $1 $239 $852 
PA Warren -$139,271 -$4,811 -$29 -$1,405 -$145,516 
PA Washington $87,100,000 $1,794,329 $243,427 $1,309,338 $90,447,093 
PA Wyoming -$7,451 -$14,077 -$36 -$8,972 -$30,536 
PA York $69,500,000 $3,915,329 $181,059 $439,519 $74,035,907 
  Total $722,395,288 $18,491,081 $2,074,438 -$1,531,261 $741,429,545 
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Table 6-18: Average Estimated Yearly Value of Changes by County for New Jersey using 
Tobit County Model 
State County SO2 NOX PM2.5 PM10 Total 
NJ Bergen -$44,309 -$320,851 -$240,853 -$1,123 -$607,135 
NJ Burlington $39,019 -$3,170 -$8,129 $51 $27,771 
NJ Camden -$5,624 -$14,477 -$29,242 -$121 -$49,465 
NJ Cape May $7,132,193 $144,867 $75,763 $15,381 $7,368,204 
NJ Cumberland $411,266 $6,414 $2,626 $975 $421,280 
NJ Essex -$18,962 -$126,643 -$107,376 -$487 -$253,468 
NJ Gloucester -$3,912 -$11,480 -$15,890 -$66 -$31,348 
NJ Hudson $19,980,942 $730,360 $387,926 $119,305 $21,218,533 
NJ Hunterdon -$943 -$4,289 -$3,589 -$16 -$8,837 
NJ Mercer $27,929,295 $605,801 $441,188 $99,485 $29,075,769 
NJ Middlesex $173,014 -$9,304 -$23,957 $356 $140,109 
NJ Ocean $19,367 -$7,797 -$9,483 $0 $2,087 
NJ Salem $2,900,821 $51,409 $41,707 $9,831 $3,003,768 
NJ Union -$13,487 -$82,910 -$71,211 -$318 -$167,926 
    $58,498,678 $957,930 $439,479 $243,255 $60,139,343 
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Table 6-19: Average Estimated Yearly Value of Changes by County for New York using 
Tobit County Model 
State County SO2 NOX PM2.5 PM10 Total 
NY Albany -$1,958 -$3,282 -$7,327 -$29 -$12,595 
NY Allegany -$832 -$2,917 -$1,615 -$6 -$5,371 
NY Bronx -$9,506 -$45,225 -$53,364 -$251 -$108,347 
NY Broome -$3 -$9 -$9 $0 -$21 
NY Cattaraugus -$2,666 -$7,156 -$7,342 -$27 -$17,190 
NY Chautauqua $7,293,456 $138,820 $52,108 $10,765 $7,495,149 
NY Clinton -$1,411 -$4,450 -$2,979 -$13 -$8,853 
NY Erie $9,086,573 $144,434 $115,441 $22,816 $9,369,264 
NY Genesee -$414 -$2,248 -$1,098 -$5 -$3,765 
NY Greene -$4,764 -$8,680 -$15,471 -$62 -$28,976 
NY Jefferson -$31 -$98 -$61 $0 -$190 
NY Kings $1,967,751 $543,645 $260,435 $8,354 $2,780,184 
NY Lewis -$43 -$111 -$87 $0 -$241 
NY Nassau -$16,006 -$88,579 -$90,498 -$418 -$195,501 
NY New York -$23,495 -$124,117 -$128,744 -$656 -$277,012 
NY Niagara $6,907,606 $137,195 $63,800 $13,468 $7,122,070 
NY Oneida -$179 -$486 -$437 -$1 -$1,104 
NY Onondaga -$1,570 -$4,166 -$4,691 -$19 -$10,446 
NY Orange $6,478,530 $316,816 $152,010 $19,352 $6,966,709 
NY Oswego $741,301 $90,257 $53,030 $1,196 $885,785 
NY Queens $13,944,874 $3,898,917 $2,253,767 $63,316 $20,160,874 
NY Rensselaer -$3,547 -$6,736 -$12,015 -$48 -$22,345 
NY Richmond -$12,832 -$63,664 -$65,229 -$301 -$142,026 
NY Rockland $181,093 $45,101 $17,878 $453 $244,525 
NY Saint Lawrence -$16 -$52 -$24 $0 -$92 
NY Saratoga -$884 -$1,905 -$2,668 -$11 -$5,468 
NY Suffolk $1,466,828 $76,375 $156,164 $3,578 $1,702,945 
NY Tompkins $10,190,978 $172,946 $93,242 $20,197 $10,477,363 
NY Wyoming -$473 -$2,041 -$1,092 -$4 -$3,609 
NY Yates $3,276,032 $78,532 $29,872 $6,380 $3,390,817 
  Total $61,454,392 $5,277,118 $2,852,996 $168,026 $69,752,533 
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Map 6-20: Distribution of Benefits from RGGI New York Area Inset 
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Chapter 7  Testing for Emissions Leakage 
     One concern about RGGI and other regional cap-and-trade programs is that emissions-
generating activities can move beyond the program’s borders, a phenomenon known as 
“leakage”.  Under RGGI, leakage occurs if electricity that would otherwise have been generated 
in the capped region is imported from a non-capped region instead. This means that reductions in 
CO2 may be counted as having occurred in the capped region even though in actuality the 
reductions were not realized because they happen in the uncapped region instead.   
Testing for leakage—in this case, from New York to Pennsylvania—is very similar to the 
approach for testing for health effects presented in Chapter 6.  Since the approach is parallel, this 
chapter will rely on Chapter 6 and discuss only a few adjustments to the model.  In Chapter 6 it 
was argued that the best method to use for the analysis was the Tobit model at the county level.  
As such, this is model utilized to test for leakage.  This model is run on both summer and non-
summer months as they were in Chapter 6, and the results from these models are discussed. 
7.1 Tobit Leakage Effects Model 
     The Tobit selection model used for testing leakage takes the form of: 
7.1 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾𝑇𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,   if yi,t > 2000. 
      𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 0 otherwise 
      Equation 7.1 is very similar to equation 6.1, but with the RGGI regressors changed.  As 
above, the regressors vary based on different dimensions, and as such are broken up into three 
different vectors.  The X vector contains the variables that change over both time and geography.  
Specifically, it contains variables for temperature (maximum and minimum), county population, 
the fuel dummies for coal and gas, and the RGGI leakage dummies.  The RGGI leakage 
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dummies are based on county location geographically in a state.  There are 5 county dummies 
used: New York inside counties, New York border counties, Pennsylvania border counties with 
New York, Pennsylvania inside counties, and Pennsylvania border counties with Maryland (see 
map 7-1).  The V vector, is the same as in equation 6.1, and contains the variables that vary by 
geography, but are set in time.  These geography varying variables are the county dummies, and 
the average plant age in a county for each fuel source.  For this analysis the plant age is set based 
on how old a plant was in 2014.  Lastly, as above, the T vector consists of variables that change 
over time.  Specifically, this vector contains the monthly fuel price for coal, gas, and oil, and 
year dummies for 2001 to 2013. 
7.2 Tobit Leakage Results Summer 
    The results of the Tobit random effects leakage regression for summer months can be seen 
in Table 7-2.  Three of the control variables, maximum and minimum temperature, and 
population are not significant in this model.  The coefficient for age is statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level, and indicates that for every year older a plant is it will produce approximately 
3,000 MWh less electricity.  The coefficient for fuel price indicates that for each dollar per 
mmBtu in price that a fuel rises, generation will fall about 22,000 MWh.  Fuel price is significant 
at the 1 percent level.  The capacity coefficient is also significant at the 1 percent level and 
indicates that for every mmBtu of generation capacity, there will be an increase of about 36MWh 
in generation.  The fuel coefficients coal and gas are significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent 
levels respectively.  If there is coal generation in a county, the model predicts that generate over 
220,000 MWh, and gas will generate over 98,000 MWh more electricity than oil. 
     The RGGI variables for leakage present conflicting stories between New York and Maryland.  
For New York, the RGGI border variable indicates a reduction in generation of nearly 33,000 
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MWh and is significant at the 10 percent level.  The RGGI New York inside variable is also 
significant at 10 percent level, and indicates only about 18,000 MWh in reduced generation.  
However, the Pennsylvania border variable with New York is not significant and indicates a 
reduction in generation, compared to the Pennsylvania inside county variable, which indicates an 
increase in generation of over 22,000 MWh and is significant at the 5 percent level.  This does 
not lend strong support for RGGI having caused leakage from New York to Pennsylvania.  
However, for Maryland there does appear to be potential for there to have been leakage from 
Maryland to Pennsylvania, though this study is not fully able to determine if it has happened.  
The RGGI Pennsylvania border counties with Maryland saw an increase of over 46,000 MWh, 
which was significant at the 1 percent level, compared to the RGGI inside variable, which was 
mentioned above was only an increase of 22,000 MWh.  This would be consistent with leakage 
from Maryland to Pennsylvania. 
7.3 Tobit Leakage Results Non-Summer 
     The results of the Tobit random effects leakage regression for the non-summer months are 
presented in Table 7-3.  For the non-summer months all of the control variables are significant.  
Both of the temperature variables are significant at the 1 percent level, with the maximum 
temperature being associated with a drop in approximately 500 MWh of generation for each 
tenth of a degree Centigrade of increased temperature, and the minimum associated with an 
increase of approximately 500 MWh per tenth of a degree of increase.  The population variable 
is significant at the 5 percent level, and is associated with an increase of over 244,000 MWh of 
generation.  The age coefficient indicates that for every year older a plant is it will produce 
approximately 4,500 MWh less electricity, and fuel price variable indicates that for each dollar 
per mmBtu in price that a fuel rises, generation will fall about 24,000 MWh.  Both age and fuel 
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price are significant at the 1 percent level.  The capacity coefficient is also significant at the 1 
percent level and indicates that for every mmBtu of generation capacity, there will be an increase 
of about 31 MWh in generation.  The fuel coefficients coal and gas are significant at the 1 
percent and 5 percent levels respectively.  If there is coal generation in a county, the model 
predicts that generate over 313,000 MWh, and gas will generate over 132,000 MWh more 
electricity than oil. 
     As above for the summer months, the RGGI variables for leakage present conflicting stories 
between New York and Maryland.  For New York, neither the border variable, nor the inside 
county variable are significant, and both show reductions in generation.  The Pennsylvania 
border variable with New York also is not significant while the Pennsylvania inside county 
variable indicates an increase in generation of over 34,000 MWh and is significant at the 1 
percent level.  This does not support RGGI having caused leakage from New York to 
Pennsylvania.  However, again there is some evidence that there may have been leakage from 
Maryland to Pennsylvania.  The Pennsylvania border with Maryland variable indicates an 
increase of over 52,000 MWh and is significant at the 1 percent level.  Compared to the inside 
Pennsylvania counties, this would be consistent with leakage from Maryland to Pennsylvania. 
7.4 Erie County, PA 
     Gas generation in Erie County, Pennsylvania ceased in 2008, just before RGGI started.  To 
understand the cause of the negative coefficient on generation for the Pennsylvania border 
counties, Erie County was dropped from the data set, and the Tobit Random Effects regressions 
were repeated.   Besides the coefficient for the Pennsylvania Counties on the New York border, 
the results for both regressions were qualitatively the same.  As a result the conversation below 
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focuses only the RGGI variables for New York and Pennsylvania and their impacts on 
estimations regarding leakage. 
     The results of the Tobit random effects leakage regression, with Erie dropped, for summer 
months can be seen in Table 7-4.  The main difference between these results and the ones 
presented in Table 7-2 is that the RGGI PA border with New York coefficient is now positive, 
but still statistically insignificant.   
    The results of the Tobit random effects leakage regression, with Erie dropped, for non-summer 
months can be seen in Table 7-5.  Now the main difference between these results and the ones 
presented in Table 7-3 is that the RGGI Pennsylvania border with New York variable is now 
larger and significantly significant at the 5 percent level.  Importantly, the coefficient for the 
RGGI Pennsylvania border is larger than that for the Pennsylvania inside counties.  This is 
consistent with leakage.  However, the New York RGGI coefficients are both not significantly 
different from zero, which is not strongly consistent with leakage. 
7.5 Conclusions Regarding Leakage 
          For the summer months, there is not strong support that there has been leakage from New 
York to Pennsylvania.  However, for the non-summer months, the Pennsylvania border and 
inside county variables do show evidence of leakage.  There is stronger evidence from the 
Pennsylvania counties that suggests that Maryland may have had leakage to Pennsylvania, which 
will be explored in future work.    
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Map 7-1: Border and Internal County Groups for New York and Pennsylvania 
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Table 7-2: Leakage Model for RGGI Summer Months 
Number of observations = 5008 
Number of groups = 122 
Wald chi2(105) = 2998.13 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.000  
Log Likelihood = -49017.34     
  Coefficient Standard Error 
Temp Max -27 .43 181 .51 
Temp Min 142 .07 202 .87 
Population 237,555 .4 166,121 .4 
Age -3,254 .59** 1,178 .52 
Fuel Price -22,006 .7*** 1,215 .73 
Capacity (mmBtu) 36 .43*** 1. 25 
Coal 221,164 .3*** 35,174 .28 
Gas 98,041 .27** 38,766 .25 
RGGI PA Border (NY) -65,979 0.22 47,821 .93 
RGGI PA Inside 22,233 .12** 11,160 .64 
RGGI PA Border (MD) 46,182 .17*** 14,648 .38 
RGGI NY Border -32,923 .62* 16,976 .85 
RGGI NY Inside -18,273 .83* 10,750 .66 
sigma u 96196 .58*** 6570 .28 
sigma e 114204 .6*** 1352 .34 
Rho 0 .415  0 .336 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
NOTE: Yearly and county dummy variables not shown. 
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Table7-3: Leakage Model for RGGI Non-Summer Months 
Number of observations = 14955 
Number of groups = 122 
Wald chi2(105) = 3802.45 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.000  
Log Likelihood = -121969.18 
  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Temp Max -519 .32*** 87 .07 
Temp Min 536 .10*** 100 .56 
Population 244,469 .4** 121,198 .9 
Age -4,502 .77*** 1,042 .11 
Fuel Price -24,194 .02*** 899 .73 
Capacity (mmBtu) 31 .90*** 0 .98 
Coal 313,791 .0*** 35,174 .48 
Gas 132,849 .9** 38,766 .61 
RGGI PA Border (NY) 26,143 0.79 47,821 .69 
RGGI PA Inside 34,276 .51*** 11,160 .36 
RGGI PA Border (MD) 52,385 .31*** 14,648 .34 
RGGI NY Border -7,191 .07 16,976 .14 
RGGI NY Inside -9,191 .96 10,750 .48 
sigma u 99102 .88*** 6806 .21 
sigma e 134371 .5*** 1010 .81 
Rho 0 .352 0 .031 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
NOTE: Yearly and county dummy variables not shown. 
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Table  7-4: Leakage Model for RGGI Summer Months with Erie County, PA Excluded 
Number of observations = 4966 
Number of groups = 121 
Wald chi2(105) = 2971.21 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.000  
Log Likelihood = -48819.27     
  Coefficient Standard Error 
Temp Max -27 .43 182 .02 
Temp Min 141 .62 202 .87 
Population 243,601 .0 166,448 .4 
Age -3,266 .69** 1,182 .74 
Fuel Price -22,199 .35*** 1,221 .35 
Capacity (mmBtu) 36 .45*** 1 .26 
Coal 220,132 .0*** 35,338 .73 
Gas 97,545 .14** 38,928 .0 
RGGI PA Border (NY) 27,620 .36 53,519 .21 
RGGI PA Inside 22,360 .62** 11,180 .52 
RGGI PA Border (MD) 46,283 .61*** 14,674 .54 
RGGI NY Border -32,819 .28* 17,004 .07 
RGGI NY Inside -18,324 .83* 10,769 .65 
sigma u 96,664 .563*** 6,626 .69 
sigma e 114,392 .7*** 1,357 .22 
Rho 0 .417  0 .338 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
NOTE: Yearly and county dummy variables not shown. 
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Table 7-5: Leakage Model for RGGI Non-Summer Months 
Number of observations = 14829 
Number of groups = 121 
Wald chi2(105) = 3780.75 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.000  
Log Likelihood = -121821.88 
  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Temp Max -516 .07*** 87 .18 
Temp Min 533 .65*** 100 .7 
Population 247,485 .6** 121,255 .4 
Age -4,524 .60*** 1,044 .69 
Fuel Price -24,275 .82*** 901 .51 
Capacity (mmBtu) 31 .90*** 0 .98 
Coal 313,663 .3*** 36,102 .95 
Gas 132,449 .9** 37,888 .32 
RGGI PA Border (NY) 61,770 .65** 30,984 .92 
RGGI PA Inside 34,369 .95*** 8,235 .87 
RGGI PA Border (MD) 52,438 .09*** 10,688 .0 
RGGI NY Border -7,059 .89 12,736 .4 
RGGI NY Inside -9,174 .79 7,994 .74 
sigma u 99,573 .88*** 6806 .21 
sigma e 134,417 .0*** 1011 .67 
Rho 0 .354 0 .032 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
NOTE: Yearly and county dummy variables not shown. 
 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
    This study uses a unique data set of observed electric generation to estimate benefits from 
RGGI that arise through reductions in conventional pollutants.  It provides a method for 
estimating benefits from other cap-and-trade programs for CO2, and could be used for better 
estimating potential benefits of any new programs that might be developed in response to the 
EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan for existing power plants. The benefits found in this study 
were more approximately $130 million per year and result from reduced SO2 and NOX emissions 
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in New York and New Jersey.  Further, a test for leakage of generation and emissions to 
Pennsylvania found little evidence of significant changes due to RGGI. 
     RGGI provides large ancillary benefits to New York and, while it participated, New Jersey, 
through reductions in NOX, SO2, PM2.5, and PM10 emissions.  These benefits are not uniformly 
distributed and counties in the western, south central, and south eastern area of New York benefit 
the most.  In New York, Queens County received a disproportionate share of the benefits while 
in New Jersey, Hudson County received the largest share of benefits.  Many counties in both 
states had very little benefit (or occasionally increased costs).  County benefits vary strongly due 
to differences in location-specific marginal damages estimated by Muller.  As shown in Chapter 
6, Tables 6-14 and 6-15, at the national level counties that have high marginal damage values are 
situated in different areas of the country: they are scattered across seven different states and the 
District of Columbia.  As such, the approach used here—which distinguishes between emissions 
at different geographic locations—would be important to many other states as they consider 
programs that would reduce CO2 emissions. 
     Leakage has been a concern of previous studies and has complicated the estimation of 
benefits from RGGI in the past.  This analysis shows that, for the time period analyzed, there is 
weak support for leakage occurring from New York to Pennsylvania.  However, as the leakage 
model presented in Chapter 4 demonstrates, leakage could become more of a problem as the 
allowance prices for CO2 under RGGI increases.  This would change the ratio between 
transmission costs and the allowance price and could thus result in large amounts of leakage 
even though it appears little has occurred at current prices.  In the long term, however, leakage 
may not be an issue if the EPA’s Clean Power Plant rules are implemented and neighboring 
states are also constrained. 
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    There is still much future research to be done that can be supported with this data.  This future 
works revolves around the resolution of the data, geographical considerations, different statistical 
techniques that could be utilized and, as discussed below, the analysis could be expanded to 
address related policy questions.  This research would allow for greater understanding of RGGI 
and cap and trade programs in general. 
     First, work will be done to increase the frequency of observations to better understand the 
behavior and response of power plants to cap and trade programs, and to understand dynamics 
between generation and demand at different times of day when a cap is present.  As mentioned in 
the model section, different fuels have different fixed costs associated with bringing generators 
on line.  Spatial methods could be utilized to account for potential spatial auto-correlation.  This 
would likely mean that switching a power plant off for short periods is infeasible, and could 
change patterns of generation that are not observable with the current data set.  It would also be 
interesting to compare the patterns of RGGI effects observed versus a hypothetical relocation of 
same reductions but being carried out at the highest marginal damage areas first.  It would also 
be interesting to analyze benefits from programs at the per capita level, as this would change the 
apparent geographic distribution of the benefits.  The number of observations could also be 
increased by adding more states into the analysis. The leakage analysis, in particular, could 
benefit from that since there are other possible places where RGGI could experience leakage.  It 
was shown that the Pennsylvania border with Delaware and Maryland showed changes 
consistent with leakage occurring.  Delaware, Maryland, and the surrounding states should also 
be tested to definitively determine if leakage has occurred. 
     Second, future work should consider increasing the number of equations used to model 
generation, moving beyond the summer and non-summer structure used in this study.  Also, 
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while there is covariance between electric generation using different fuel types, there is also 
some evidence that generating units using different fossil fuels behave differently and hence 
should be treated as separate equations.  There should also be further work on investigating the 
role of size differences between units, and whether large and small units should be modeled 
differently.  Also, there are interactions between fuel types, different size plants, and seasonal 
time periods that should be tested. 
     Lastly, work could be done to expand this analysis and to answer related policy questions.  
There are likely to be water quality benefits from the changes in fuel usage patterns 
demonstrated in this study.  Also, by adding prices of electricity into the analysis a number of 
other research topics could be addressed.  First, it could be estimated how much RGGI has cost 
consumers in higher prices, and supply and demand for electricity could likely be estimated 
through simultaneous equation methods. 
     From a policy standpoint it is clear that trading programs for global pollutants from fossil 
fuels, will produce local benefits and damages.  However, the benefits will be much larger in 
magnitude than the damages.  Further, investing in lower transmissions costs would likely allow 
for greater trade between regions, and would allow for generation to occur in areas with lower 
marginal damages.  Due to the differences in marginal damages, and the association of high 
damages with urban areas, the ancillary benefits from EPA’s CPP program is likely to 
disproportionately flow to urban areas.   
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Appendix A: NOAA Data Supplement 
NOAA Data Processing: 
State County Mapped to State County Mapped to 
NY Bronx Queens PA Greene Fayette 
NY Genesee Erie PA Indiana Westmoreland 
NY Kings Queens PA Lackawanna Luzerne 
NY Nassau Queens PA Lawrence Butler 
NY Richmond Queens PA Montour Lycoming 
NY Rockland Westchester PA Northampton Lehigh 
NJ Camden Burlington PA Northumberland Snyder 
NJ Gloucester Burlington PA Schuykill Lehigh 
NJ Hudson Union PA Venango Crawford 
NJ Ocean Burlington PA Wyoming Sullivan 
NJ Salem Burlington       
 
NOAA Climatic Divisions Maps.9 
  
 
                                                          
9 Available from: 
http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/analysis_monitoring/regional_monitoring/CLIM_DIVS/states_counties_cl
imate-divisions.shtml 
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